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THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
SHI-LING HSU∗
ABSTRACT
The identifiability effect is the human propensity to have stronger
emotions regarding identifiable individuals or groups than for
abstract ones. The more information that is available about a person,
the more likely this person’s situation will influence human
decisionmaking. This human propensity has biased law and public
policy against environmental and ecological protection because the
putative economic victims of environmental regulation are usually
easily identifiable workers that lose their jobs, while the
beneficiaries—people who avoid a premature death from air or water
pollution, people who would be saved by medicinal compounds
available only in rare plant and animal species, and future
generations not subjected to harmful changes in climate—are
unidentifiable abstractions.
More fundamentally, however, this identifiability bias has helped
create structural biases in legal institutions against environmental
and ecological protection. For example, the doctrine of standing
creates a bias against unidentifiable victims of environmental wrongs,
because of the obvious necessity of showing injury in fact to an
identifiable party. Other legal concepts common to a liberal legal
tradition also serve to protect the interests of individuals—identifiable
individuals—against state action. This liberal conception of law
underweights the rights of unidentifiable individuals that are often
beneficiaries of state action.
Importantly, this is not simply a variant of public choice theory.
Many lawmaking decisions and institutions harbor biases against
unidentifiable individuals that are not explainable in monetary
terms. And importantly, this is not simply a variant of the availability
heuristic. Identifiability is more subtle and lasting than
sensationalist media accounts of spectacular events that serve as
available heuristics. The identifiability bias in environmental law is
based on a fundamental human instinct, not a monetary one, and
affects deeper decisionmaking processes.
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thanks Robin Kundis Craig, Joseph Feller, Cherie Metcalf, Bruce Pardy, and Hoi Kong for
their help and comments, and David Madani, Ida Martin, and Jeffrey Yuen for their
research assistance. This Article was written with the support of the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consuming about half of the front page of the June 23, 2005,
Globe and Mail newspaper of Canada, was an up-close photo of a
forty-one-year-old woman hugging her twelve-year-old daughter,
with an accompanying headline of “Breast cancer survivors fighting
for new drug.”1 The woman is Ontario breast cancer patient Leslie
Cowan, and the drug is Herceptin, a drug believed to have novel
breast cancer-fighting properties.2 But because Ontario’s Health
Minister had not yet approved the use of Herceptin, it was not a drug
treatment that the province would have paid for under its public
health care system at the time.3 So, as the article reported, Leslie
Cowan was seeking treatment in the United States (U.S.), which
would cost her approximately $100,000 a year.4 Ms. Cowan was
reported as saying, “I will have to remortgage my home in order to
receive cancer treatment in the U.S. . . . . I don’t know if my kids will
be able to go to college, but at least I’ll be alive.”5
The very next day, the Globe and Mail reported that the Ontario
Health Ministry would fast-track the review process so that
1. Lisa Priest, Breast Cancer Survivors Fighting for New Drug, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), June 23, 2005, at A1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.

2008]

THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS

435

Herceptin would become fundable by the province within a few
months.6 Health Minister George Smitherman was quoted in the
article as saying “I’m a human being like anybody else and I’m
personally impacted by personal stories . . . . I have a very, very keen
personal sense of the degree to which this is a tremendously
impactful decision point for some women and many families in the
province of Ontario.”7
It certainly seems callous to take issue with the Health Minister’s
intervention. But, one wonders, when George Smitherman jumped
Herceptin to the top of the queue, what drugs were pushed aside?
Might there have been people who were hurt by this move?
One drug that might have been held up was Methotrexate, which
was approved for provincial funding in October 2005, shortly after
Herceptin’s approval.8 Methotrexate is a curiously versatile drug that
is used in chemotherapy treatment for acute lymphoblastic leukemia
(most commonly children’s leukemia), rheumatoid arthritis, Crohn’s
disease, psoriasis, and ironically, breast cancer.9 Much is still
unknown about Methotrexate, despite a great deal of clinical study.10
Was a possible delay in the funding of Methotrexate worth it? Quite
possibly, but a rational inquiry would examine a variety of factors,
including the incidences of the diseases treated by Methotrexate and
Herceptin, their effectiveness in treating such diseases, their
incremental effectiveness relative to existing treatments, and
perhaps their cost. The week that Herceptin was approved, the
Canadian Medical Association Journal published an editorial
questioning the wisdom of the province’s approval, especially given
the $148 million price tag funding Herceptin and two other drugs
over a three-year period.11
But the way that a newspaper story changed, in one day, the
priorities of the largest provincial health ministry in Canada is much
more important and subtle. The response to the June 23, 2005
article, which focused so intensely on Leslie Cowan and her family,
6. Lisa Priest, Ontario Will Fast-Track Breast Cancer Drug, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), June 24, 2005, at A1.
7. Id.
8. Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Ontario Drug Benefit
Formulary/Comparative Drug Index, Methotrexate (search record on file with author).
9. MedlinePlus, U.S. National Library of Medicine and the National Institute of
Health, Methotrexate, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/medmaster/
a682019.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008); MedicineNet.com, Methotrexate,
http://www.medicinenet.com/methotrexate/article.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008); National
Psoriasis Foundation, Systemic Treatments: Methotrexate, http://www.psoriasis.org/
treatment/psoriasis/systemics/methotrexate.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
10. A Pubmed search turned up over 5700 medical journal articles discussing
Methotrexate. Pubmed, http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
11. Editorial, Genomics and Economics, 173 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 329 (2005); see also
Elaine Carey, Do Politics Affect Drug Coverage?, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 19, 2005, at D02.
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illustrates how the identifiability of individuals profoundly affects
public policy and lawmaking. This story was decisively effective in
identifying Leslie Cowan and other breast cancer victims and
pushing their appeal to the top of the agenda. What gets ignored,
however, is the effect that this diversion of Health Ministry resources
might have had on people that might have benefited from
Methotrexate or other drugs that were delayed in approval or study
because of the fast-tracking of Herceptin. These individuals were
unconsciously shoved aside because they were less clearly
identifiable to the Ontario Health Minister.
This anecdote is, of course, only one example of a legal or policy
decision that is affected by the identifiability of stakeholders to some
dispute. This Article argues that environmental law is an area of law
and policy that is particularly susceptible to systemic bias due to
stakeholder identifiability. The problem is that the beneficiaries of
environmental law tend to be less identifiable than those that might
be economically harmed by environmental law. As a result, the
identifiability effect works a consistent bias against the cause of
environmental protection, and in some cases, economic progress as
well. Part II of this Article describes the identifiability effect, as
developed by psychologists. Part III discusses how the identifiability
effect impacts public debate over environmental issues. Part IV sets
out several examples of environmental conflicts that have been
affected by the identifiability of stakeholders. While Part IV
describes specific instances of the identifiability bias affecting the
outcome of environmental conflicts, Part V describes cases in which
the identifiability bias has insinuated itself into the very structure of
law in ways that work to the systematic detriment of environmental
protection. Part VI examines why structural identifiability biases
exist. Part VII of this Article discusses how the identifiability bias
may be countered. Some cases are discussed in which environmental
advocates have been able to use the identifiability effect to their
advantage, finding a stakeholder group with interests that are
coincident with an environmental goal, thus making them somehow
more identifiable than the economic victims of environmental
protection. While environmental advocates are occasionally able to
tap into the identifiability bias, this Article argues that these cases
are the exception, not the norm. This Part examines several
legislative and administrative mechanisms that have reduced the
identifiability bias in environmental law and policy. These
mechanisms curb the judicial and administrative discretion that
allows identifiability to creep into environmental decisionmaking and
are the key to more systemic reform that will keep the identifiability
bias under wraps. Part VIII concludes with some summary remarks.
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II. THE IDENTIFIABILITY EFFECT
Identifiability is the propensity for people to have stronger
emotions regarding identifiable individuals or groups than for
abstract, unidentifiable ones.12 Psychological researchers have long
known that the more information there is available about a person,
the more memorable that person becomes, and the more likely that
this person’s situation will influence human decisionmaking.13 Thus,
we are more inclined to help or favor people who can be readily seen
or heard than we are for more abstract, statistical victims.
Charitable organizations have known for a long time that people are
more willing to lend aid to a cause that has a vivid poster child. The
identifiability effect also seems to exist for punitive impulses—people
seem more willing to punish wrongdoers that they can identify, as
opposed to those they cannot.14 The identifiability effect was, at least
in earlier versions, a theory of a linkage between “vividness” and
intensity of conviction.15 As Nobel Laureate economist Thomas
Schelling said in 1968, “when we know the people, we care.”16
Research findings on identifiability clearly pose challenges to
economic assumptions of rationality. The identifiability effect also
raises the problem that human decisionmaking and public
policymaking could be inconsistent across situations with different
identifiability characteristics, even if the situations are substantively
indistinguishable. As psychological researchers have pointed out,17
while “Baby Jessica” McClure was trapped in a well for several days,
sympathetic media-watchers sent her family over $700,000 to assist
with rescue efforts—enough money to save hundreds of children’s
lives if spent on preventative health care;18 also, the North American
Free Trade Agreement was met with fierce resistance (and continues
to be the subject of criticism) because opponents could point to
12. Although they do not set out a formal definition, Deborah A. Small & George
Loewenstein describe and study the phenomenon in more specificity in their article The
Devil You Know: The Effects of Identifiability on Punishment. 18 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING
311 (2005).
13. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 43-62 (1980).
14. Experimental situations have shown that research subjects have been more
willing to punish misdeeds carried out by more identifiable wrongdoers, even if given very
modest identifiability markers, such as numbers. See Small & Loewenstein, supra note 12;
George Loewenstein et al., Statistical, Identifiable and Iconic Victims and Perpetrators
(Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No.
301, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=678281.
15. Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect,”
14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235, 237 (1997).
16. T. C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127, 129-30 (Samuel B. Chase, Jr., ed., 1968).
17. The following examples are noted in Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 23536.
18. Id. at 236.
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individuals in specific industries that were likely to lose their jobs,
while proponents could only argue that the additional economic
prosperity would create some unidentifiable jobs, somewhere.19 In the
criminal law context, the difference between a murder trial in which
nothing is said or shown about the murder victim and one in which
the identity of the victim is prominently on display, may mean the
difference between acquittal and conviction,20 or, in the sentencing
phase, the difference between life and death.21 Perhaps most
troubling, the conscious use of identifiability as a rhetorical weapon
in some instances and not others, and for some causes and not
others, will create an added impetus for some causes and not others,
an impetus that may not be warranted.
It is now an oversimplification to say that identifiability is merely
a theory of “vividness.”22 The psychological explanations of
identifiability have evolved over the last decade. What exactly is the
cognitive process that makes people more willing to help or punish?
Is it truly just an emotional link between the vividness of a person
and our inclination to help or punish? In addition to the vividness
theory, recent experiments on the impulse to help have suggested
three other possible theories for the identifiability effect:
CERTAINTY: Kahneman and Tversky’s “prospect theory” posits
that people overweight certain outcomes relative to uncertain ones.23
As compared to statistical victims, identifiable victims exist with 100
percent certainty, so that efforts to help such a person will definitely
benefit a person. Identifiability in this sense, by eliminating the

19. Walter Goodman, TV, by Its Very Nature, Can Stack the Deck, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
13, 1993, at C20.
20. A recent case before the Supreme Court involved the question of whether it was
inherently and critically prejudicial for a murder victim’s family to sit in the second row of
the gallery wearing buttons that displayed the victim’s picture. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S.
Ct. 649 (2006).
21. For some empirical evidence on the proposition that victim impact statements
affect the likelihood of a death sentence, see Edith Greene et al., Victim Impact Evidence in
Capital Cases: Does the Victim’s Character Matter?, 27 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 145
(1998); James Lugmbuhl & Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a Capital Trial:
Encouraging Votes for Death, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 5-6 (1995). The Supreme Court has
itself flipped on the legal question, holding in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987),
that victim impact statements at the sentencing phase were inadmissible, but then
overruling that just four years later in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-30 (1991). For
a lively scholarly exchange about the effects and the appropriateness of victim impact
statements, see Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996); Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell: What We Know About Victim
Impact Statements, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 545; and Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates?
A Reply to Critics of the Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479.
22. Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 237.
23. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
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uncertainty as to whether someone truly benefits, is the greater
certainty that a tangible positive outcome will occur.24
REFERENCE GROUP: People overweight risks that are faced by a
specific group or region because they conceive of risks more
concretely in smaller groups.25 If risks are dispersed throughout a
larger population, people tend to underweight this risk relative to a
risk that is faced by a larger fraction of a smaller group, even if the
number of people at risk is the same.26 So a 10% risk faced by
100,000 people will be viewed with more seriousness than a 1% risk
faced by one million people. Under this theory of identifiability,
people prefer to help identifiable victims because the identification,
in effect, creates a “reference group” composed entirely of the
identified victims.27 This effect can be empirically separated from the
certainty effect.28
EX ANTE VS. EX POST: Once an event has occurred, people attach
greater blame and responsibility to the event for a victim’s plight,
providing greater impetus to the need to help.29 People may thus feel
more compelled to help someone once misfortune has befallen him or
her, rather than take preventative measures to help avoid the
misfortune.30 Since identifiable victims typically only become
identifiable because the misfortune has occurred, people may be
expressing a desire to help people ex post, rather than ex ante.
The most recent experimental simulations seem to favor the
“reference group” theory of identifiability.31 This is an important
finding because it shows that the identifiability effect is not simply
another version of the availability heuristic,32 in which vividness
merely makes examples seem more familiar and available to people.
The identifiability effect can be much more subtle, tapping into
cognitive processes that affect how people view the place of
individuals and groups within a larger society. That said, there is
considerable overlap among all four of these theories, and no
24. See generally Milton C. Weinstein et al., The Economic Value of Changing
Mortality Probabilities: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 94 Q. J. ECON. 373, 374, 393-95
(1980) (analyzing the theory of willingness to pay in order to affect probability of death).
25. Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 238-39.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim:
Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5-7 (2003) (citing research
findings in Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 15).
29. Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 239.
30. Weinstein et al., supra note 24, at 374.
31. Jenni & Loewenstein, supra note 15, at 249-53.
32. The availability heuristic is the propensity for people to overweight probabilistic
outcomes in which they have a readily available experience to relate to. Highly mediapublicized events tend to serve as availability heuristics. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1509-10 (1998).
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disentanglement has been made so that one theory of identifiability
has emerged. For purposes of this Article, it seems safe to conclude
that whatever the cognitive process for people feeling more strongly
about identifiable persons than unidentifiable ones, the more
information we have about a person or group, and the more specific
we can be about a person or group, the more likely we are to help or
punish.33 It is nevertheless useful to keep separate these four specific
theories of identifiability, as they help us recognize and analyze more
specific patterns of behavior.
From a rhetorical perspective, these experimental simulations
confirm that which skilled legal advocates already know: that
invoking vivid images and being more specific about people, rather
than appealing to abstract notions, helps win arguments. Law
professors are well aware of the pedagogical value of using actual
stories about real people to help illustrate a point. Lawmakers as
well, most of whom are trained in these skills of persuasion, have
frequently drawn on identifiability as a rhetorical tool. In fact, the
danger is that lawmaking has become unduly influenced by the
identifiability of stakeholders.
III. THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The identifiability effect poses special problems for environmental
law and policy, such that it consistently biases lawmaking against
environmental and ecological protection. While environmental debate
is hardly alone among hot-button topics in eliciting emotionally
charged public debate, environmental law is particularly vulnerable
to behavioral anomalies that are tapped by identifiability oriented
arguments. Emotional arguments that emphasize the economic
hardship of identified individuals or groups tap into heuristic
processes that cause an overweighting of the costs of environmental
protection and underweighting of the benefits of environmental
protection. This creates a bias against the enhancement of
environmental quality or ecological protection. Emotional appeals,
from both environmental advocates and skeptics of environmental
regulation, bring these biases to the fore, essentially substituting an
emotional intensity meter for a rational means of making
33. Even small amounts of information, such as a number that identified but did not
name a victim, made research subjects significantly more likely to aid victims. Small &
Loewenstein, supra note 28, at 8-11. In one study, a group of research subjects were given
$10 to begin with. Id. at 8. At random, the $10 was taken away from half of the subjects.
Id. The half retaining their $10 were asked if they were willing to give up some of their $10
to aid those that had lost theirs. Id. at 8-9. Their willingness to do so was highly correlated
with the amount of information they had about the person or persons losing their $10. Id.
at 9-10. Even a small amount of information, such as a number that represented a specific
person, boosted willingness to pay, as compared with a situation in which no information
at all was available about a victim. Id.
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environmental decisions. In part because of the identifiability effect,
those arguing for greater environmental quality or ecological
protection on the basis of emotional appeals will generally lose this
contest.
Consider a typical debate over a proposed environmental or
ecological law that tightens some standard, at some economic cost, or
over an existing law that regulated parties believe is unduly
restrictive. Detractors of the law will be able to point to specific
individuals or specific communities that will supposedly lose their
jobs or their way of life if the proposed law is enacted or complain
that the existing law is overly protective of the environment.34 Of
course, these claims are often exaggerated by affected industries. But
more to the point, these putative economic victims of environmental
protection are highly identifiable to most people. Moreover, these
victims are often romanticized—loggers, ranchers, farmers, and
fishers as rugged frontiersmen, and mineworkers and factory
workers as noble laborers—and are thus strong attractors of
sympathy from lawmakers and the general public. The same Globe
and Mail that gave Leslie Cowan her fame also featured on the front
page of its August 19, 2005 British Columbia section a huge photo of
ruddy-faced sixty-seven-year-old fisher Mike Forrest, who was going
to suffer because of the planned closure of the Pacific salmon
fishery.35 The article tells us that Mr. Forrest “invested $350,000 in
an aluminum boat in the 1990s for commercial salmon fishing. He
said he believed federal politicians who promised that a
reorganization of the Pacific salmon fisheries would ensure the
livelihood of those who kept their federal fishing licences . . . . But
that’s not how things worked out.”36 This story was long on the life of
Mike Forrest, a third generation salmon fisher (“My dad did this, my
grandfather did it. This is who I am, what I’m about.”), yet was
remarkably bereft of any mention of the collapse of the Pacific
salmon that necessitated the closure,37 and, incredibly, of the longsuffering aboriginal fishers and their legally superior rights to fish
for Pacific salmon.38 Nevertheless, the Canadian Department of
34. President George H.W. Bush campaigned for re-election in 1992 on a platform of
reforming the ESA, vowing to block renewal of the ESA and arguing for a reformed law
that would give “greater consideration to jobs, families and communities.” Michael Wines,
Bush, in Far West, Sides With Loggers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1992, at A25.
35. Robert Matas, Fish Season to Get the Hook, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 19,
2005, at S1.
36. Id.
37. See Population Numbers May Doom Salmon: Scientists, Analysts Believe Wild
Pacific
Fish
Could
Become
Extinct,
MSNBC.COM,
Sept.
7,
2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9239431/.
38. See Emily Walter et al., Fishing Around the Law: The Pacific Salmon
Management System as a “Structural Infringement” of Aboriginal Rights, 45 MCGILL L.J.
263 (2000).
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Fisheries and Oceans opened up a consultation process in the Fall of
2005 that resulted in a number of meetings with the Commercial
Salmon Advisory Board (the fishers’ organization) lasting into 2006,39
before finally limiting the Fraser River salmon fishery to a nominal
four-fish-per-day catch for the 2006 season.40 An entire year was lost
in attending to the economic needs of the Fraser River salmon
fishers.
Of course, the Globe and Mail is hardly alone in serial
sensationalism—examples abound in which a tension is deliberately
created between environmental protection and the economic health
of some identifiable group of individuals, with the obvious media
preference for reporting on the latter.41 More significantly,
congressional lawmakers have become extremely skilled at using the
identifiability effect to dramatize the plight of their constituents,42
39. See, e.g., Canada Dep’t of Fisheries & Oceans, Fisheries Mgmt., Pac. Region, Wild
Salmon Policy, http://www.pac.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/species/salmon/wsp/default_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2008).
40. The fishery area in question, the Fraser River, suffered large declines in sockeye
salmon runs in 2004 and 2005, leading to the proposed and slowly implemented fishing
restrictions. The limits are available at http://www.pac.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/recfish/Tidal/area
29_e.htm#Salmon (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
41. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Hook, Line and Sunk, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, § 6
(Magazine), at 75 (“[Clenching a knife in his teeth, fingers bloodied] from a long night
wrestling squid and a new net that cuts to the bone, Tony Demelo finishes up his chores in
the port where Herman Melville learned how to swear. The morning light has chased away
the prostitutes and drug dealers who roam the cobbled streets of New Bedford’s waterfront
district, bartering in Portuguese. Nearby, commuter traffic carries workers with soft hands
and clean clothes to office towers in Providence and Boston.”); Lisa Leff, Company Town
Carved From Old Growth Faces Uncertain Future¸ WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/31/AR2006123100407
_pf.html (describing uncertainty facing company logging town being sold because of
decreased logging opportunities due to environmental restrictions); Tom Pelton, Suit
Threat Frustrates Hog Farmers: Environmental Groups Targeting Bay Pollution,
BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 22, 2007, at 1A (highlighting the plight of pig farmers whose manure
is causing water pollution in the Chesapeake Bay); Joe Wojtas, An Old Fleet Under a Dark
Cloud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, at 14CN (describing in detail the economic dislocation of
the Portuguese immigrant fishers of Stonington, Conn.).
42. In just looking at the issue of grazing on public lands, for example, Michael Byrne,
president of the Public Lands Council, complained that Wild and Scenic River designations
have caused dislocation in the cattle ranching industry that depends on federal grazing
permits:
More than 50 operations ran cattle along the subject area of the Donner
and Blixen, Owyhee, and Malheur Rivers, involving hundreds of people
if you consider that each operation often consisted of several different
families. Elimination of these ranch operations means the elimination of
a way of life that has been in place for generations in many cases.
Grazing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands and Forests of the S. Comm. on
Energy and Natural Resources, 109th Cong. 24 (2005) (prepared statement of Michael
Byrne, President, Public Lands Council, on Behalf of the National Cattlemen’s Beef
Association). Congressman Scott McInnis has also weighed in by stating:
[U]nfortunately, what happens out there is . . . the national Sierra Club,
Earth First, and by the way, most of these are headquartered not in this
area, they are headquartered back here in the East, primarily in
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momentarily crowding out everyone else that may have a stake in
the outcome of an environmental conflict. Even if the identified
groups are quite large, advocates on their behalf have succeeded in
reducing the reference group size so that the group is at least more
identifiable than the reference group of beneficiaries—all of the rest
of us.
In stark contrast to the identifiability of those who are
economically harmed by environmental regulation, the beneficiaries
of environmental protection are mostly unidentifiable. Air pollution
and water pollution and environmental exposure to toxic substances
claim many victims, resulting in the premature death of many and
sickening many others.43 Consider this: air pollution from coal-fired
power plants alone are estimated to cause 30,000 premature deaths
in the U.S. every year,44 the equivalent of approximately one fully
Washington D.C., who come into this area and try and dictate . . . the
policies of their special interests on the management of these Federal
lands . . . . The kind of impact that it has is, it drives our ranching
communities [out] . . . . And these families, and again look at my in-laws,
David and Sue Ann Smith, we can still see the cabins where their
grandparents came and homesteaded in that area. And they are very
dependent frankly upon multiple use of Federal land. So is everybody in
Meeker, Colorado. So is everybody in Grand Junction.
144 CONG. REC. H2804-05 (May 5, 1998) (statement of Rep. McInnis). From the Senate
side:
I don’t think people understand that ranching is the economic backbone
for many rural communities in the West . . . . [W]hen you kill the
ranching industry you also kill Main Street. I believe a disproportionate
increase in a fee could do just that, and . . . would indeed have
devastating repercussions for the rancher and the community.
142 CONG. REC. S2397-02 (1996) (statement of Sen. Dorgan) (arguing against an increase
in grazing fees for grazing on federal lands).
43. For a general discussion on the health effects of air and water pollution, see Robin
Kundis Craig, Removing “the Cloak of a Standing Inquiry”: Pollution Regulation, Public
Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 149 (2007).
44. A consulting firm, Abt Associates, which has contracted with the EPA and a
number of environmental organizations, estimated in 2000 that coal-fired power plants
accounted for roughly 30,000 premature deaths each year. ABT ASSOCS., THE PARTICULATERELATED HEALTH BENEFITS OF REDUCING POWER PLANT EMISSIONS, EXHIBIT 6-3,
ESTIMATED PM-RELATED HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH AIR QUALITY
CHANGES RESULTING FROM THE REMSAD-BASED “ALL POWER PLANT” SCENARIO 6-4
(2000). This figure has been cited on numerous occasions, and over time, seems to have
withstood the barrage of electricity industry attacks on Abt Associates and the study. See,
e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S1515 (Feb. 24, 2004) (statement of Rep. Jeffords), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2004_record&page=
S1515&position=all; News Release, Sen. Ron Wyden, Wyden Backs Clean Air Legislation
(June 26, 2002) (on file with author); AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, STATE OF THE AIR:
2004,
PROTECTING
THE
NATION
FROM
AIR
POLLUTION,
http://lungaction.org/reports/sota04_protecting2.html; FY 2006 Budget of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Before the S. Appropriations Subcomm. on Interior &
Related Agencies, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of S. William Becker, Executive Director,
State & Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators), available at
http://www.4cleanair.org/SenateTestimony0405.pdf;
Current
Environmental
Issues
Affecting the Readiness of the Department of Defense: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on

444

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:433

loaded 747 jumbo jet crashing into a mountainside every week.45 How
many weeks of a jumbo jet crashing would we tolerate before we
would completely ground air traffic, or at least undertake heroic
measures to make air travel safer? Imagine, then, that we knew
ahead of time which 30,000 people would die in the upcoming year
from air pollution—is it not conceivable that we would undertake
similarly heroic measures to reduce air pollution?
The epidemiology of air pollution has developed into a science that
establishes very strong links between air quality (especially the
concentration of fine particulate matter) and health outcomes and
has withstood the barrage of industry assault.46 But however
conclusive the statistical link between air pollution and health
outcomes, none of the millions of those sickened nor tens of
thousands dying from air pollution can actually trace their injuries
or deaths to a specific source of pollution, or even to pollution
generally. As a result, the prospective victims of air pollution may
never be identified to anybody and will remain abstract, weak
attractors of sympathy, and systematically under-represented.
To add another dimension to this problem, the identifiability of
persons decreases dramatically as one looks to the future. It has
never been a secret that future generations are frequently and
systematically shortchanged in a wide variety of public policies. We
demand income tax cuts that drive budgets into deficit and mortgage
Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of S. William Becker, Executive
Director, State & Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/Hearings/04212004hearing1252/Becker1
942.htm; Bernard L. Cohen, The Nuclear Power Advantage, http://www.npcil.nic.in/
nupower_vol13_4/npaavol4.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
45. There are many models of Boeing’s 747, but a common one, the 747-400, carries
524 passengers in a two-class configuration. Technical Characteristics – Boeing 747-400,
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/747family/pf/pf_400_prod.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2008). A quick calculation shows that 524 passengers dying once a week yields 27,248
deaths per year.
46. Event studies have tracked fluctuations in pollution, in particular particulate
matter, with health outcomes. Changes in health outcomes have been studied in the
presence of events that change pollution levels. Luke Clancy et al., Effect of Air-Pollution
Control on Death Rates in Dublin, Ireland: An Intervention Study, 360 LANCET 1210 (2002)
(involving a ban on coal sales); Anthony Johnson Hedley et al., Cardiorespiratory and AllCause Mortality after Restrictions on Sulphur Content of Fuel in Hong Kong: An
Intervention Study, 360 LANCET 1646 (2002) (involving new restrictions on the sulfur
content of fuel oil); C. Arden Pope III et al., Daily Mortality and PM10 Pollution in Utah
Valley, 47 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 211 (1992) (involving a strike at a local steel mill).
Other, more statistically robust studies tracked the health outcomes of large groups of
individuals over long time periods. These “cohort,” or panel data studies, have been the
focus of several rulemakings and have been heavily scrutinized. Douglas W. Dockery et al.,
An Association Between Air Pollution and Mortality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1753 (1993); C. Arden Pope, III et al., Particulate Air Pollution as a Predictor of
Mortality in a Prospective Study of U.S. Adults, 151 AM. J. RESPIR. & CRIT. CARE MED. 669
(1995); see also Francine Laden et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate Air Pollution and
Mortality, 173 AM. J. RESPIR. & CRIT. CARE MED. 667 (2006).
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our children’s future so that we have higher current disposable
income.47 Despite an overwhelming consensus on the need to reduce
gasoline consumption and reduce pollution from cars and trucks, we
resist gasoline taxes because they would reduce our current
disposable income.48 This resistance has easily trumped a nearly
universal belief among economists that a higher gasoline tax is the
most effective and efficient way to reduce gasoline consumption.49
47. Former Congressional Budget Office Director Robert Reischauer, who served
under both Presidents George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton, was quoted in a New
York Times article as lamenting the continued failure of Congress to deal with a looming
budget crisis over the costs of Medicare and Social Security: “The long-term budget crisis
appears so distant that it’s going to be very hard to get politicians excited about it this year
. . . . The economy is strong, and the deficit seems to be at manageable levels right now. No
one wants to risk popular support by doing something courageous.” Steven R. Weisman,
Democrats Face Limits in Reshaping Bush Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at A19. The
article describes how Congressional Democrats badly wish to overturn President Bush’s
budget and be seen as balancing the federal budget, but have limited options given that
they are afraid of the political ramifications of ending the President’s tax cuts, which
expire in 2010. Id.
48. See, e.g., Richard Simon & Mary Curtius, GOP Fears Gas Price Anger May Spill
Over, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at 1. A New York Times/CBS poll conducted in 2006 asked
if respondents generally favored an increase in gas taxes; 85% said they would oppose it,
while 12% said they would favor an increase. Respondents were more receptive to a
gasoline tax if it would reduce global warming, but if the tax was as much as $2.00, 87%
said they would again oppose it. The poll results are available online at
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20060228_poll_results.pdf (last visited Feb.
15, 2008). Writer T.C. Boyle wrote an op-ed in The New York Times purportedly
“confessing” to being a gas hog. T.C. Boyle, Op-Ed, To Pump or Not to Pump, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 2006, at 4. He wrote of his commute between his Santa Barbara home and the
University of Southern California where he teaches:
That’s the conundrum out here in the land of the automobile. We’d like
to do our bit for the environment—and out-of-control gas prices awaken
in us a fervent desire to save at the pump . . . [but] when Monday comes,
we need our cars
....
. . . My commute to the University of Southern California is an unholy
200 miles round-trip and it consumes time . . . and fuel. I drive a
powerful sports car because of the burning need to subdue and outrace
all those other commuters, and . . . I make it alone and I make it as
expeditiously as I can, with little thought for what it is costing, on every
level.
Id.
49. Economists so universally favor “Pigouvian” taxes to reduce pollution
externalities, a list of citations would be pointlessly voluminous. A recent Wall Street
Journal survey of sixty economists found that of the forty-seven respondents, forty favored
a fossil fuel tax as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Economists Favor Fossil
Fuels Tax to Spur Alternatives – Survey, E&E NEWS PM, Feb. 8, 2007. An especially
important Pigouvian tax is a gasoline tax. Economists such as politically diverse New York
Times columnist Paul Krugman, who has spent virtually every column in the past four
years criticizing the Bush Administration, and Gregory Mankiw, who served as President
Bush’s Chief Economic Advisor, favor a higher gasoline tax. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews.
Economics Adviser Learns the Principles of Politics, N.Y. TIMES, February 26, 2004, at C4;
Paul Krugman, Gasoline Tax Follies, N.Y. TIMES, March 15, 2000, at A23. Professor
Mankiw is the founder of the “Pigou Club,” an “elite group of pundits and policy wonks
with the good sense to advocate higher Pigouvian taxes,” which includes higher gasoline
taxes.
Greg
Mankiw’s
Blog:
The
Pigou
Club
Manifesto,
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There is no sharper illustration of the human propensity to
dramatically discount the welfare of future generations than the
world’s abject failure to deal with the problem of climate change.
Although awareness of climate change and momentum for climate
change legislation grows even in the U.S.50—the lone holdout from
the Kyoto Protocol now that Australia has ratified the agreement51—
it is easy to forget that we have been aware of the risks of climate
change for decades.52 In 1978, Congress passed the National Climate
Program Act,53 which required the President to establish a program
to “assist the Nation and the world to understand and respond to
natural and man-induced climate processes and their implications.”54
In 1987, Congress passed the Global Climate Protection Act,55 which
required, among other things, the establishment of a National
Climate Program Office, which would develop and carry out national
policy on climate change.56 Of course, neither law imposed any
http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2006/10/pigou-club-manifesto.html (Oct. 20, 2006). Nobel
Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, President Clinton’s Chief Economic Advisor, recently called for a
global carbon tax, justifying such a tax by saying, “[t]here is a social cost to emissions, and
the common environmental tax would simply make everyone pay the social cost. This is in
accord with the most basic of economic principles.” Joseph E. Stiglitz, A New Agenda for
Global
Warming,
3
ECONOMISTS’
VOICE
1,
3
(2006),
available
at
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1210&context=ev. A gasoline tax has
been favored even by the libertarian Grover Norquist, who favors the shifting of tax
burden from income taxes to consumption taxes such as gasoline taxes. Robert H. Frank, A
Way to Cut Fuel Consumption That Everyone Likes, Except the Politicians, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2006, at C3.
50. Felicity Barringer & Andrew C. Revkin, Measures on Global Warming Move to
Spotlight in the New Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A24 (describing how the
110th Congress appears to be more apt to move forward with climate change legislation);
Darren Samuelsohn, Global Warming ‘a Sleeper Issue’ in Midterm Election ― Zogby Poll,
GREENWIRE, Nov. 17, 2006 (on file with author) (showing that concern with global climate
change played a role in the Democratic Party gains in the 2006 midterm elections). Even
President George W. Bush acknowledged the need to address climate change in his state of
the union address on January 23, 2007, his first reference to global climate change in his
six years in office. Darren Samuelson, Six Years in, Bush Gives Warming his State of the
Union Debut, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Jan. 24, 2007 (on file with author).
51. In one of his first acts as the new Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd
obtained ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on December 3, 2007. Australian Government,
Department
of
Climate
Change,
International
Activities,
Kyoto
Protocol,
http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/international/kyoto/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
52. A 1979 National Academy of Sciences report stated that “[w]e now have
incontrovertible evidence that the atmosphere is indeed changing and that we ourselves
contribute to that change. Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are steadily
increasing, and these changes are linked with man’s use of fossil fuels and exploitation of
the land.” CARBON DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE: A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT, REPORT OF AN AD
HOC STUDY GROUP ON CARBON DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE, CLIMATE RESEARCH BOARD,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL vii (1979), available at http://www.atmos.ucla.edu/~brian
pm/download/charney_report.pdf.
53. Ch. 56, § 2, 92 Stat. 601 (1978) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (2000)).
54. Id. at § 3 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2902 (2000)).
55. Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 1101-06, 101 Stat.
1407 (1987) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2000)).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 2904(c) (2000).
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binding obligations on anyone to do anything about climate change.
Senator Timothy Wirth’s 1988 National Energy Policy Act, however,
called for, among other things, a reduction of carbon dioxide
emissions by 20 percent below 1988 levels by the year 2000, energy
efficiency regulations on all buildings, and the development of coal
liquification and carbon dioxide recovery from coal-fired power
plants.57 Testifying in favor of the law was Dr. Stephen H. Schneider,
the Stanford climatologist and author of the 1984 book, The
Coevolution of Climate and Life, and one of the early scientists
warning of climate change. His explanation of global climate change
was met by then-Senator Bill Bradley’s remark “[t]hat answer would
not be understood by any of my constituents [laughter] who would be
faced with higher electricity rates in order to deal with the situation
or higher gasoline prices . . . .”58 With the identifiability of his
constituents affecting one of the Senate’s most reliable
environmentalists, it is no wonder that Senator Wirth’s bill died.
As noted above, there is no controversy among economists that in
order to reduce pollution from motor vehicles and to reduce
dependence on foreign suppliers of oil, the preferred method would be
to increase gasoline taxes. And yet, historically, gasoline taxes have
been categorically rejected as a means of achieving behavioral
changes in American driving habits on the grounds that it would
require difficult behavioral changes in American driving habits. In
response to a proposed 1975 bill to increase gasoline taxes,
Congressman Bill Alexander of Arkansas thundered:
If this tax is enacted, we will be requiring the people of the
heartland of America to carry this burden on both shoulders.
It is unfair; it is inequitable; it is grossly discriminatory
against the . . . people of this country who do not have access
to public transportation. . . . Did you ever hear of anybody
catching a subway in Osceola, Arkansas, or a bus in
Bugtussle, Oklahoma?59

The identifiability strategy is patent, drawing Osceola, Bugtussle,
and “heartland” America into the debate. To underscore the
divergence of the identifiability effect from public choice theory,
however, it is important to note that the opposition to the 1975

57. S. 2667, 100th Cong. (1988). For a summary of the Act, see The Library of
Congress, THOMAS, S. 2667, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d100:SN02667
:@@@L&summ2=m&.
58. STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER, GLOBAL WARMING: ARE WE ENTERING THE GREENHOUSE
CENTURY? 26-27 (Sierra Club Books 1989).
59. PIETRO S. NIVOLA & ROBERT W. CRANDALL, THE EXTRA MILE: RETHINKING
ENERGY POLICY FOR AUTOMOTIVE TRANSPORTATION 88-89 (1995) (citing 121 CONG. REC.
18,435 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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gasoline tax proposal was widespread, attracting representatives
from many urban centers as well.60
Today’s environmental champions are repeating this mistake.
Jack Layton, the leader of Canada’s federal New Democratic Party
(NDP), considered the most environmental of the four federal parties,
is on record as being a strong supporter of the Kyoto Protocol.61
Layton has been sharply critical of the other political parties’
attempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Canada as being
insufficient and weak.62 Incredibly, however, when gasoline prices
spiked in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Layton called
for gasoline price regulation. Layton argued that high gasoline prices
are “affecting people in their daily lives . . . [and] affecting small
businesses,” and it “isn’t fair to Canadians who have to budget
around gas prices or cannot rely on adequate public transit
systems.”63 Perhaps this is just politics. But it is a remarkable
disconnect between Layton’s public position on climate change and
the one happenstance that induced Canadians to drive less and
purchase fuel-efficient vehicles for the first time in decades. Layton’s
tortured position is made possible by the identifiability of those
Canadians suffering from high gas prices. And again, under a
reference group theory of identifiability, these people need not be
named individuals with their photo splashed across the front page of
a major newspaper—all that is required is to reduce the reference
group size to one that people can better identify.
To be sure, the rhetoric of much opposition to environmental and
ecological protection is expressed in terms of economic costs. Many
debates about environmental and ecological protection are
characterized by discussion about the economic costs of such
measures, rather than references to specific individuals and groups
of people. However, the rhetoric of economic costs is only powerful
because of its traceability to actual people. Even as President Bush
and other opponents of greenhouse gas regulation express concern
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Jack Layton, Leader, New Democractic Party, Speech on Climate
Change Accountability Act (Feb. 5, 2007), available at http://www.ndp.ca/page/4892.
62. Layton has criticized the current Administration of Prime Minister Stephen
Harper for its refusal to act on climate change, boasting that it “forced Harper’s flawed
‘Clean Air Act’ into an all-party committee for a full re-write. The NDP has tabled 15 tough
amendments, challenging Parliament to adopt a plan for immediate action to combat
global warming and meet Canada’s Kyoto targets.” NDP, Taking the Lead on Climate
Change, http://www.ndp.ca/page/4769 (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). Also, when current
Liberal Party leader Stephane Dion Layton was Environment Minister, Layton wrote an
open letter to Dion criticizing the then-governing Liberal government for its weak plan to
reduce greenhouse gas emission. Jack Layton, Jack’s Open Letter to Stephane Dion,
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Feb. 16, 2005, available at http://www.ndp.ca/page/1307.
63. Mike Adler, Layton Seeks Gas Price Probe, INSIDETORONTO.COM, Aug. 26, 2005
(on file with author).
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about the costs of complying with limits on greenhouse gases,64 they
made it clear that the costs were those that would be suffered by “our
families and workers,”65 and “American business[es].”66 The inclusion
of the words “our” and “American” is not accidental.67 It reflects
conscious attempts to convey the message that costs don’t just accrue
anywhere—they accrue in identifiable individuals. On the day that
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its
fourth and most recent assessment of the science of climate change,68
Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman reiterated the Bush
Administration’s position that “the imposition of a carbon cap in this
country would . . . lead to the transfer of jobs and industries abroad
that do not have such carbon caps.”69 Again, conspicuously absent is
mention of the many, many potential victims and costs of climate
change.70
It would thus be a mistake to say that an economic debate has
replaced an emotional debate about the victims and beneficiaries of
environmental regulation. Cost-benefit analysis has become a wellestablished practice in federal environmental regulation, having
been the subject of an executive order in every administration since
the Reagan administration, including President Clinton’s.71 But the
64. President Bush’s opposition to mandatory limits to greenhouse gas emissions in
the U.S. has been based upon his stated concern that it will hurt the U.S. economy. Justin
Blum, Senate Rejects Greenhouse Gas Limits, WASH. POST, June 23, 2005, at A8.
65. Id. (“ ‘My first priority is protecting our families and workers,’ said Sen.
Christopher S. Bond (R-Mo.). The amendment, he added, ‘will hurt our families, hurt our
nation’s energy security, drive jobs overseas.’ ”).
66. Big Business Pushes Bush on Carbon Caps, CBS NEWS, Jan. 23, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/01/23/business/main2387501.shtml?source=RSSattr=
HOME_2387501 (describing how Bush has “refused in the past to enact legislation that
would impose mandatory caps on carbon emissions, claiming the move would hurt
American business”).
67. Similarly, in Canada, when a motion was passed in the House of Commons calling
for steep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, Labor Minister Jean-Pierre Blackburn said, “If
we took drastic measures to the point that companies had to close, that would not be
right.” Canada’s House Backs Steep Emissions Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at A19.
68. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS (Feb. 5, 2007), available at
http://www.aaas.org/news/press_room/climate_change/media/4th_spm2feb07.pdf
[hereinafter 4TH IPCC].
69. Darren Samuelsohn, Bush Officials Insist No Change is Coming on GHG Caps,
GREENWIRE, Feb. 2, 2007 (on file with author).
70. Not to be outdone, the counterargument by Sen. Joseph Lieberman, who along
with Sen. John McCain sponsored a bill to limit greenhouse gas emissions, warned “[t]he
real losers here are our children and grandchildren, who, if we don’t act soon, are going to
inherit a planet that is not going to be as hospitable as the one we were given by our
parents and grandparents.” Blum, supra note 64, at A8.
71. President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866 modified the requirement but did not
abandon cost-benefit analysis. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
President Reagan: Executive Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). President
George H.W. Bush continued carrying out Executive Order 12,291, and President George
W. Bush has continued carrying out Executive Order 12,866.
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many sloppy references to the costs of regulation, without
consideration of the benefits of regulation, are not cost-benefit
analyses. Cost-benefit analysis requires a sober look at both sides of
the ledger.72 The fixation on the costs of environmental protection, as
a rhetorical tool, is still an appeal to sympathies for people that are
more identifiable than those people that would be helped by laws or
regulations focusing on environmental protection.
This Article is written from an anthropogenic point of view. For
every environmental or ecological problem, I assume that there are
human interests involved, even if the connection appears tenuous.
While the preservation of rare and endangered species raises
significant moral questions, it also implicates human welfare. The
collapse of ecosystems due to the extinction of some keystone
species73 may ultimately have very important human consequences,
whether it be the loss of an important pharmaceutical resource,74 the
loss of important ecosystem services,75 or just the loss of a
recreational or aesthetic resource.76 While the moral questions are

72. Judge Richard Posner has recently dedicated the better part of a book to a costbenefit analysis of climate regulation, concluding somewhat informally that regulation is
badly needed. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004). The
most recent and probably the most authoritative analysis is the Stern Review on the
Economics of Global Climate Change, conducted by the Treasury of the United Kingdom,
which concluded that failure to act would amount to losing 5-20% of GDP forever, whereas
taking actions to avoid climate change would cost less than 1% of GDP. STERN REVIEW,
THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS, at x, xii-xiii, available
at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/4/3/Executive_Summary.pdf.
73. A keystone species is one that is particularly important to its home ecosystem,
such that its removal would bring about a profound change in the makeup of the
ecosystem. It is a species “whose impact on its community or ecosystem is large, and
disproportionately large relative to its abundance.” Mary E. Power et al., Challenges in the
Quest for Keystones, 46 BIOSCIENCE 609, 609 (1996); see also Keystone Species—Why
Prairie Dogs Are So Important, http://www.prairiedogs.org/keystone.html (“A keystone
species is a species whose very presence contributes to a diversity of life and whose
extinction would consequently lead to the extinction of other forms of life. Keystone species
help to support the ecosystem (entire community of life) of which they are a part.”) (last
visited Feb. 15, 2008).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 79-81.
75. For example, wetlands provide a variety of tangible services, such as water
purification, groundwater recharge, and floodwater buffering. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl,
Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 612
(2000).
76. For example, the multiple environmental threats facing the Great Barrier Reef,
including warming ocean waters, threaten the viability of a possibly critical ecosystem in
the Southern Pacific Ocean, but also threaten the tourism industry that receives two
million tourists and five million recreational visitors each year. Great Barrier Reef Marine
Park Authority: Tourism and Recreation, http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/corp_site/key
_issues/tourism (last visited Feb. 15, 2008); Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority:
Overview—The Current Status of the Great Barrier Reef: Feb 2006,
http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/corp_site/info_services/publications/sotr/overview (last visited
Feb. 15, 2008) (“[S]ince 1998, the Great Barrier Reef has suffered its two worst ever
recorded coral bleaching events, caused by unusually hot sea water . . . .”).
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important, I raise the human welfare implications—the interests of
unidentifiable individuals—as a minimum basis for concern.
IV. INCIDENTAL IDENTIFIABILITY BIASES
This Article explores the manifestations of identifiability bias in
law and lawmaking and considers two ways in which the bias
influences environmental law and policy: incidental identifiability
bias, in which direct identifications of individuals or groups are
invoked in specific, discrete instances to advance a particular policy;
and structural identifiability bias, in which certain legal doctrines or
institutions are established in such a way as to systematically
discount the welfare of unidentifiable stakeholders. While incidental
identifiability bias is easily recognizable and potentially susceptible
to a remedy, structural identifiability bias challenges some of our
core values of representative democracy and judicial restraint. This
Article restricts its analysis and proposals to those identifiability
biases, incidental and structural, that affect environmental law and
policymaking. Addressing the many other identifiability biases
across our democratic and judicial systems is a task left for future
scholarship.
Incidental identifiability biases against environmental law can be
seen in legislative, judicial, and administrative lawmaking.
Identifiability crops up as a policy factor simply because of its
rhetorical power. In the following examples, the identifiability bias
plays a direct role in a conflict-specific, or “incidental,” way.
A. Bias in Legislatures
U.S. Congressional debates are replete with poignant references
to specific individuals, held up as exemplar victims of a capricious
government bureaucracy, or some other symbol of the need to curb
and limit environmental regulation. One of the most potent
rhetorical weapons of those opposed to environmental and ecological
protection has been the invocation of the noble logger, rancher,
farmer, miner, fisherman, or factory worker as a symbol of the dear
price that must be paid for environmental protection. Note that this
mode of rhetoric is effective under three of the theories of
identifiability:
•

Vividness, because it is easy to conjure up in one’s mind
what these people look like, and the difficult physical
conditions under which they often labor;

•

Reference group, because these references are to a
specific industry or a specific community highly
dependent upon an industry; and
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Certainty, because of the perceived certainty that some
people will lose their jobs, as opposed to the perception
that environmental benefits are still somewhat
unproven.

These references need not be highly specific to raise the
identifiability of an individual or a group. A reference to “timber
families” or “ranching communities” is sufficient to raise
identifiability and evoke an emotional response.77 Experiments by
psychologists of how much people were willing to help others have
shown that even seemingly insignificant amounts of information,
such as an identification number without a name, were sufficient to
increase a person’s willingness to pay to help.78
Conservation of biological diversity has been especially hampered
by an identifiability bias. While the noble loggers, ranchers, and
others have always been easy to identify and paint, the beneficiaries
of biological diversity are extremely difficult to identify. We know
that many important pharmaceutical discoveries are derived from
plants and wildlife that are sometimes at risk of extinction, such as
the ugly Pacific Yew tree, which yields the breast cancer-fighting
compound taxol,79 or the rosy periwinkle, which produces compounds
that are effective in fighting leukemia, Hodgkin’s disease, and
77. For example:
That preservation [law] has wreaked incomprehensible havoc on timber
families who have had to live with prolonged uncertainty about their
futures. All indices of human despair have gone through the roof in these
communities: child abuse, spousal abuse, alcohol and substance abuse,
divorce, adolescent depression and suicide attempts, bankruptcies, and
illness.
138 CONG. REC. S16941 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
Is it our intention to mindlessly punish communities that mine coal or
produce steel or chemicals or automobiles? . . . These are also real people
with real families—men and women who do hard, dirty, and often
dangerous work. Are we to punish certain regions because of some sort of
legislated value judgment about who is responsible for the quality of our
air?
136 CONG.REC. S531-01 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1990) (statement of Sen. Byrd). In his account of
the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Gary Bryner wrote that during the
floor debates over the Clean Air Act Amendments “Byrd held the floor during much of the
week of March 19, describing in detail the lives and deaths of coal miners.” GARY BRYNER,
BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 1990, 105 (1993).
I rise in defense of the people of the 2nd District of Maine, and especially
the loggers, the farmers, and the fishermen of Washington County.
Unemployment there recently nudged above 10 percent. The traditional
uses of land, the jobs they depend upon, and the families that need those
paychecks are under fire . . . . [M]y constituents feel besieged by a Federal
proposal to list as endangered Atlantic salmon in the rivers of the region. A
listing would strain the economy which is based on natural resources.
146 CONG. REC. H1105-06 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2000) (statement of Rep. Baldacci).
78. See supra text accompanying note 33.
79. University of Maryland Medical Center, Breast Cancer: About Taxol,
http://www.umm.edu/breast/taxol.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
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testicular cancer.80 Both of these plant species narrowly averted
extinction.81 The beneficiaries of biological diversity are all of
humankind. This not only dilutes the importance of biological
diversity, but reduces identifiability in exactly the opposite way that
the identifiability of loggers, ranchers, and others are amplified:
•

Vividness, because it is impossible to imagine the face of
person with a disease that would be cured by a
compound produced by some rare plant or wildlife
species;

•

Reference group, because the reference group of “all of
humankind” is as large as it can possibly be; and

•

Certainty, because the probability of any one rare plant
or wildlife species that stands in the path of development
would yield a life-saving compound is apt to be low,
causing people to underweight its importance.

As a society, we discount the importance of biological diversity
because although we rationally know that lives will be saved by
conserving biological diversity, these beneficiary lives are statistical
and abstract, and from our perspective, somewhat uncertain. We also
discount it because the long development timeline of most drugs
exists far into the future. For policy purposes, they might as well not
exist at all.
Can identifying an environmental perpetrator rally emotional
forces around the cause of punishing a wrongdoer? Recall that the
identifiability effect can cut both ways—stimulating an instinct to
punish as well as to help. In egregious and discrete cases of midnight
dumping of toxic wastes, for example, where an individual is clearly
identified and is caught doing something clearly wrongful,
identifiability serves to excite our instinct to punish. However, in the
endangered species context, where the leading causes of extinction
are habitat loss,82 isolating a wrongdoer is deeply problematic.
Similarly, in a pollution context, where there are thousands, perhaps
millions, of contributors to the air pollution problem (including
ourselves as we drive motor vehicles), the causal link that is required
to identify a wrongdoer is virtually impossible to establish. So,
despite the existence of an occasional environmental villain, the
80. Herbs2000.com, Rosy Periwinkle, http://www.herbs2000.com/herbs/herbs_
periwinkle.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
81. New Source of Cancer Drug Spares Yew Tree, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1993, at 1-16;
Cincinnati
Zoo
&
Botanical
Garden,
Planting
Seeds
for
the
Future,
http://cincinnatizoo.org/Exhibits/GardenBest/PlantingSeeds/plantingseeds.html
(last
visited Feb. 15, 2008).
82. See, e.g., PETER KAREIVA ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
AND SYNTHESIS, USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 20 (2000), available at
http://www.aibs.org/bookstore/resources/hcp-1999-01-14.pdf.
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identifiability effect is not generally going to be one that excites our
impulses to punish environmental wrongdoing.
The identifiability bias has played a prominent role in the U.S.
Congress in its deliberations on conserving biological diversity. In
1995, a barrage of congressional criticism about the economic and
social effects of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), both on the floors
of the House and Senate and during a series of impromptu hearings
held in rural areas, spelled trouble for the ESA.83 The hearings were
naked attempts to publicize the hardships supposedly suffered by
landowners, farmers, loggers, and other stakeholders negatively
impacted by ESA regulations.84 Numerous attempts to repeal or
substantially amend the ESA were proposed in 1995 and 1996,85 and
it was only the surprising intervention of House Speaker Newt
Gingrich that prevented their passage.86 As it turns out, Gingrich,
the conservative architect of the Contract With America, aspired as a
youngster to be a zookeeper.87 In a meeting with Michael Bean, the
noted environmental attorney, and Edward O. Wilson, the eminent
Harvard ecologist, Gingrich promised he would continue to use his
post as Speaker to prevent the ESA reform proposals from reaching
the House floor.88 In parting, however, he warned that conservative
interest groups and his Republican colleagues, armed with personal
interest stories of beleaguered ranchers and farmers, were “turning
up the heat.”89 In fact, these ESA reformers did succeed in
legislatively imposing a moratorium on new listings of species under

83. Rep. Richard Pombo of California helped establish an Endangered Species
Committee in 1995 to hold hearings throughout the western U.S. on the economic and
social effects of the ESA. Pombo unapologetically orchestrated the hearings into rallies of
farmers, ranchers, and loggers that felt threatened by ESA regulation, arguing that for
years, the ESA debate had been stacked against them, and that it was now their turn. See
Nancy Vogel, Environmental Law Attacked: Foes Rip Endangered Species Act,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 29, 1995, at A1; David Horsey, Greens on the Run; GOP Wave
Threating Environmental Regulations, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCIER, Nov. 5, 1995, at
E1.
84. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game-Theoretic Approach to Regulatory Negotiation and
a Framework for Empirical Analysis, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 33, 52-53 (2002).
85. See, for example, H.R. 2364, 104th Cong. (1995), sponsored by Rep. Shadegg (RAZ), which would have made the ESA a strictly voluntary law; Rep H.R. 2275, 104th Cong.
(1995), sponsored by Rep. Young (R-AK), which would have limited regulation under the
ESA to direct physical harming of endangered species; H.R. 2490, 104th Cong. (1995),
sponsored by Reps. Tauzin (R-LA) and Fields (R-TX), which would have required external
peer review before the listing of any species under the ESA; and S. 768, 104th Cong.
(1995), sponsored by Sen. Gorton (R-WA), which would have reversed the citizen suit
provision to be available only to those economically harmed by regulation.
86. Michael J. Bean, The Gingrich That Saved the ESA, ENVTL. F., Jan./Feb. 1999, at
26, 30.
87. Id. at 27.
88. Id. at 30.
89. Id. at 30-31.

2008]

THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS

455

the ESA for a period of six months. 90 To the optimist, the failure of
detractors of the ESA to overturn it is certainly a success; however,
there have been no attempts to strengthen and improve the ESA,
and this is due largely to the virulent opposition to the ESA.
It should surprise no one that legislatures invite references to
identifiable individuals. Legislatures are, after all, bodies of elected
representatives; legislators are supposed to identify their
constituents and protect and advance their interests. In fact, a public
choice theorist might go further and argue that these interests make
it a matter of self-interest for legislators to protect and advance their
interests. To be sure, a theory of identifiability bias overlaps with
public choice theory. Public choice theorists would certainly agree
that certain economically powerful constituents are much more
salient to the legislators, if only because of the monetary incentives
they provide to legislators who represent them. This is not
inconsistent with the theory of identifiability. Rather, the
monetization is simply another form of identifiability and serves as a
way of keeping legislative attention on the powerful constituents,
even if they are not mentioned by name on the floor of the House or
Senate.
However, even the most vigorous public choice theorists would
agree that their theory does not explain all legislative action.91 The
vast majority of lawmaking activities that take place daily cannot be
accurately modeled by a rational actor model. Beliefs about public
policy clearly matter.92 A theory of identifiability can account for not
90. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1996,
Publ. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-156, 1321-159 to -160 (1996).
91. Perhaps the strongest adherent of public choice theory is Judge Frank
Easterbrook, who wrote that “[m]y theme is tendencies, not truths. No one approach can
explain all decisions.” Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARV. L. REV. 4, 58 (1984); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
223, 228 (1986).
The arguments in this [a]rticle do not hinge on an assumption that all
legislation is best explained as self-serving behavior narrowly construed.
Indeed, they assume not only that laws are passed for a wide variety of
reasons, but also that, as a general matter, it is impossible for judges to
reconstruct the complex array of motives that prompted the passage of a
particular statute. Some legislation serves the public interest by
maximizing society’s welfare from an economic perspective.
Id.
92. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 893-98 (1987). As a stark contrast to public choice, the
advocacy coalition framework posits that political actors (with ability to influence policy)
will form and break coalitions with other political actors, some with similar political
beliefs, and some not, but ultimately for the end of some political goal consistent with their
political beliefs. See, e.g., Paul A. Sabatier, An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy
Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein, 21 POL’Y SCI. 129, 131 (1988);
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Analytical Debates and Policy Learning: Analysis and Change in
the Federal Bureaucracy, 21 POL’Y SCI. 169, 170-71 (1988).
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only those lawmaking actions that public choice theorists model, but
also those for which a sincere desire to make the right decision is the
objective. Even such well-intentioned decisions, this Article argues,
can be unduly influenced by differential identifiability of
stakeholders.
B. Bias in the Judiciary
The identifiability bias insinuates itself into judicial
decisionmaking as well. While judges are not elected to represent
constituents as legislators are, their cases are still intensely focused
on the parties before them. Unless the law relevant to the case has
some built-in protection for unidentifiable persons, judges are still
apt to think first about the rights and obligations of those appearing
before them.
For example, the progression of American regulatory takings
jurisprudence into a complex assessment of the expectations of the
property owner smacks of a judicial obsession with fairness to the
property owner, usually an identifiable individual plaintiff bringing
her case before the court. Whereas the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, by its terms, contemplates only the physical
confiscation of property as a compensable governmental action,
modern takings jurisprudence has expanded into the realm of
“regulatory takings”—cases in which compensation is sought for a
regulation that devalues property, rather than physically confiscates
it.93 Earlier cases undertook extensive reviews of cases in
determining the extent of the police power94 and abstained from
analyzing the effects upon persons whose property was regulated.95
93. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City sets forth three factors that are
to be considered in an “essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y].” 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The
three factors, which seem to represent the midpoint of a shift from a focus on the
governmental action to a focus on the claimant, are: (i) the economic impact upon the
claimant, (ii) the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment-backed
expectations, and (iii) the character of the governmental action. Id. While Penn Central
remains good law, more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence seems to have abandoned
any analysis of the last factor in favor of the first two. Stephen J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise
of “Investment-Backed Expectations,” 32 URB. LAW. 437, 437 (2000). Although the article
argues that investment-backed expectations have become the “prime determinant of what
constitutes ‘property,’ ” it is obvious that the impact of frustrating such expectations is
focused upon the economic effects on the claimant. Id.
94. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1928) (upholding a
municipal zoning law, despite its effect of severely reducing the value of a parcel previously
zoned as industrial); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding a Kansas
prohibition on the production and sale of alcoholic beverages).
95. See, for example, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, which upheld a Los Angeles city
ordinance prohibiting the construction of brickyards and brick kilns and explicitly rejected
consideration of the well-averred financial hardship imposed upon the plaintiff, who had
purchased land with the expectation of mining the clay for a brick kiln. 239 U.S. 394, 410
(1915). The Court held simply that the prohibition was well within the ambit of the police
power, and it dismissed considerations of the impact on the claimant. Id. “[The police
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Not only have courts strayed from an inquiry into the nature of the
governmental action, but they have become obsessed with
determining the reasonableness of a property owner’s expectation of
being free from regulation. Regulatory takings cases have become
focused almost completely on the property owner, asking whether the
complained-of regulation was fair to the property owner.96 This drift
away from the terms of the Constitution and toward a bias in favor of
property owners is driven by the identifiability bias.
Even more troubling for environmentalists is the skill with which
property rights organizations litigating regulatory takings cases have
been able to troll for “sympathetic plaintiffs”—plaintiffs toward
whom juries would have a greater degree of compassion. Hence,
landmark regulatory takings cases have been brought on behalf of an
eighty-two-year-old widow hoping to realize her late husband’s
dream to develop their Lake Tahoe streamside property,97 a smalltown hardware store owner wishing to pave her parking lot and
expand her store,98 and a “lifelong resident” of a town in which the
resident hoped to develop a three-acre wetland into residential
housing units.99 Clearly, property rights organizations such as the
Pacific Legal Foundation, the Mountain States Legal Foundation,
and the Defenders of Property Rights have figured out the
identifiability bias and have begun using it to their advantage.100
The identifiability effect perhaps reared its head most
prominently in and after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v.
City of New London,101 in which the Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld
the city’s taking of private property to further economic development
in an effort to revitalize its downtown area.102 Compensation was not
at issue, only the meaning of whether such a redevelopment plant
constituted a “public use” that justified the city’s exercise of the
eminent domain power.103 Justice O’Connor’s bitter dissent chided
power] may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individual, but the
imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not exerted
arbitrarily.” Id.
96. For example, in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., the Court
held that repeated denials of building permits by the city were unfair and repetitive land
use procedure, constituting a compensable taking. 526 U.S. 687, 698 (1999). In Palazollo v.
Rhode Island, the Court held that a post-regulation transfer did not preclude a finding
that the property owner’s expectation of development was “reasonable.” 533 U.S. 606, 617
(2001).
97. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 730-31 (1997).
98. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 (1994).
99. See Palazzollo, 533 U.S. at 613.
100. See, e.g., Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance, An Antidote to Wetland Loss,
Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155 (2007) (explaining the “sanctifying” of
property owners).
101. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
102. Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 477.
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the majority for “wash[ing] out any distinction between private and
public use of property—and thereby effectively [] delet[ing] the words
‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”104
Her dissenting opinion also made a point of noting that:
Petitioner Wilhelmina Dery . . . lives in a house on Walbach
Street that has been in her family for over 100 years. She
was born in the house in 1918; her husband, petitioner
Charles Dery, moved into the house when they married in
1946. Their son lives next door with his family in the house
he received as a wedding gift . . . .105

It is unclear what the role of this personal description plays in
the jurisprudence of eminent domain, but it appears to have moved
Justice O’Connor. Her dissent fueled a sharp reaction from the
property rights movement106 and spawned a flurry of state activity
protecting or purporting to protect property owners from another
Kelo;107 this despite the fact that Kelo was not a landmark case and
was fairly consistent with current jurisprudence on eminent
domain.108 In the aftermath of Kelo, Alabama, Texas, Delaware, and
Ohio enacted legislation that, to varying degrees, constrain the
ability of municipalities to take property by eminent domain. At least
eighteen other states subsequently proposed legislation.109 Some of
these state initiatives change relatively little, while others may truly
constrain eminent domain powers.110 But, in all cases, state
legislatures have wanted to at least appear to have taken action.
C. Bias in Administrative Agencies
In the regulatory arena, the general notion of “regulatory capture”
is one that has been studied in a number of different settings, one of
which is the relationship between field office regulators and
individual or small-group regulated parties.111 A special form of
104. Id.
105. Id. at 494-95.
106. Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo is Not Good News for Local Planners and Developers, 22
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2006).
107. Id. at 830-39.
108. Id. at 803.
109. Id. at 830-36.
110. Id.
111. The notion of regulatory capture is that regulatory agencies respond to the
regulated entities rather than act in the public interest. Theories abound as to the exact
mechanism of how this might take place. One is that repeated regulatory encounters
between regulators and regulated entities, where each has some means of punishing and
rewarding the other, will give rise to implicit cooperation. IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE, ch. 3
(1992). Another theory of capture stems from George J. Stigler’s The Theory of Economic
Regulation, which demonstrated how industries may lobby for and acquire regulation
when it serves to insulate them from competition. 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
Finally, a “revolving door” system of regulation in which regulators are employed by the
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capture exists in agencies such as the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) or the United States Forest Service, which rely heavily upon
field offices to carry out federal policies.112 Policies, even if driven
from Washington, D.C., are thus the responsibility of local field
officials to carry out, and they have a significant amount of discretion
in doing so.113 These local officials face a strong temptation to
interpret their regulatory mandate in such a way as to fit local
norms.114 Where field officials are members of the community and
identify more strongly with the community than with Washington
bureaucrats, and where field officers deal much more regularly with
regulated parties than with superiors in Washington, D.C., there is a
natural tendency to view the problem from the point of view of the
local community.115 The local view would be that federal policy
protecting the environment or ecology claims identifiable victims of
some capricious regulatory policy concocted by a distant federal
bureaucrat. Incidents of identifiability bias are thus common in field
officials that adopt a local view and adjust or enforce policies flexibly,
ignoring or suppressing the fact that their sympathy with the local
community comes at the expense of the more diffuse and less
identifiable public interest.
For example, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel,116 an
environmental organization sued the BLM for adopting a range
management plan based on an environmental impact statement that
did not consider the alternative of eliminating grazing permits
altogether and only contained one alternative that even
contemplated a modest reduction in grazing.117 The organization
argued that under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
under which the environmental impact statement was conducted,
this omission was inexplicable given the extremely arid and
unfavorable conditions for grazing on this particular area of federal
land.118 The court upheld the BLM’s actions in every regard,
including its cursory environmental impact statement.119 While not
obviously incorrect in its decision—a rule of reason standard may
support the BLM’s actions—the court paid very short shrift to the
proposition that grazing might be eliminated altogether. The court
cited the BLM’s environmental impact statement, stating that
regulated entities after the regulator leaves the government is one in which the potential
for capture is obvious. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology
and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 569 (2002).
112. PHILLIP O. FOSS, POLITICS AND GRASS 199-204 (1960).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 624 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1985).
117. Id. at 1052.
118. Id. at 1053.
119. Id. at 1063.
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[t]he complete abandonment of grazing in the Reno planning
area is practically unthinkable as a policy choice; it would
involve monetary losses to the ranching community alone of
nearly 4 million dollars and 290 jobs, not to mention
unquantifiable social impacts. Of course, compared with the
economy of the Reno area as a whole, ranching plays only a
negligible role. Nevertheless, eliminating all grazing would
have extreme impacts on this small community. A “no
grazing” policy is simply not a “reasonable alternative” for
this particular area.120

This court was upholding what is a fairly widespread practice in
the BLM to favor local interests that are resource-consuming, such
as ranching, overconservation, and recreation interests.121 Aided by
statutes that were sufficiently vague122 to allow a great deal of
discretion for field managers, the BLM has frequently given short
shrift to less identifiable individuals, those that benefit from
preservation, and even recreationists, who would be much less
present than ranchers and others that engage in consumptive uses of
BLM land.
It is worth noting that the regulatory capture literature has
extensively studied the types of interactions described above. But
again, as a cousin of public choice theory, most of the explanation for
capture revolves around the self-interest motivation of regulatory
officials: the need to obtain information from regulated parties,123 the
threat of reprisal from powerful congressional representatives that
are supported by the regulated parties,124 and the “revolving door”
theory that regulators often leave government employment for a job
in the sector that they regulated.125 These three explanations,
however, do not explain all of the cases of regulatory capture. The
120. Id. at 1054 (citations omitted).
121. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why
“Multiple Use” Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 422-27 (1994); Joseph M. Feller, The
Comb Wash Case: The Rule of Law Comes to the Public Rangelands, 17 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 25, 28 (1996); Joseph M. Feller, Grazing Management on the Public
Lands: Opening the Process to Public Participation, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 571, 571-77
(1991) [hereinafter Feller, Grazing Management].
122. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988),
provides that “resource management plans” be drawn up for each district under the
jurisdiction of the BLM, in accordance with “multiple use” objectives, including grazing,
preservation, recreation, and other uses. While the statute contemplated management of
BLM lands for all of these uses, virtually none of the plans have any true grazing
management plans, only grazing allowances, allowing ranchers to graze on federal lands
without any ecological restrictions whatsoever. Feller, Grazing Management, supra note
121, at 577-78.
123. Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and
Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 280-88 (2004).
124. Blumm, supra note 121, at 419, n.85.
125. William T. Gormley, Jr., A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC, 23
AM. J. POL. SCI. 665, 666, 681-82 (1979).
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question of exactly what monetary incentives truly bear on the
everyday decisions of a field official are not fully explained by a
rational economic actor model that underlies the regulatory capture
literature. It is implausible that every field official making hundreds
of mundane daily decisions is controlled by monetary self-interest.
Ontario Health Minister George Smitherman’s bold move is one
example. Hundreds, perhaps thousands more take place every day.
To some extent, there must be some psychological factors at work
that are not accounted for in regulatory capture theory or public
choice theory.
V. STRUCTURAL IDENTIFIABILITY BIASES
As opposed to incidental identifiability biases, in which the direct
invocation of individuals or groups tilts a particular decision in favor
of those individuals or groups, structural identifiability biases are
those institutions, practices, and doctrines that are established in
such a way as to intentionally favor certain individuals or groups.
Typically, these institutions, practices, and doctrines reflect
fundamental values that ensure that individuals or groups are
treated fairly in political and legal systems. But, by focusing on
fairness to certain individuals or groups, attention and resources are
naturally drawn away from those that are not identified as those
beneficiary individuals or groups. In other cases, structural
identifiability biases stem from our fundamental notions of
separation of powers and perhaps some larger sense of how
government is supposed to work. In liberal democratic systems, both
of these biases are deeply ingrained in our political culture and
therefore serve to systemically work to the disadvantage of
unidentifiable individuals and groups. Because some of these
institutions, practices, and doctrines are so fundamental, the
identifiability bias inheres without much alarm on our part as to the
missing, unidentifiable constituents. As with the discussion on
incidental identifiability biases, this Article examines some examples
of structural biases occurring in legislative, judicial, and
administrative contexts.
A. Bias in Legislatures – Grandfathering
Grandfathering is the practice of exempting existing polluters or
land uses from new laws or regulations that would otherwise render
them unlawful.126 It is based upon a reluctance to impose new laws
and regulations upon costly investments and a reluctance to interfere
with otherwise legitimate expectations of an investor in an existing
126. Shi-Ling Hsu, The Real Problem With New Source Review, 36 ENVTL. L. REP.
10095, 10096 (2006).
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legal regime.127 Grandfathering is the legal expression of an instinct
so basic to liberal values in democratic societies that it has woven
itself into all manner of regulation, environmental and otherwise. 128
As noted in passing above, the regulatory takings inquiry has
become an inquiry into whether, among other things, the regulation
frustrates a landowner’s “investment-backed expectations,”129
implying that a regulation may require compensation if the
landowner could not have foreseen a new land use regulation. This is
a form of grandfathering: the legal recognition, even
constitutionalization, of rights to continue doing what one was doing.
A more explicit example is the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
creating the New Source Review regulatory program, which requires
the installation of state-of-the-art pollution control equipment
whenever a new air-polluting facility is constructed.130 Importantly,
New Source Review did not apply to existing facilities, on the theory
that sudden and expensive regulatory changes frustrated their
investment expectations.131 In another example involving large
investments, the debate over electricity deregulation was influenced
by three prominent economists who argued that it was necessary to
compensate and protect the owners of “stranded facilities,” power
plants that are so inefficient that they would be unable to compete in
deregulated retail electricity markets.132 While electricity
deregulation is still a story without an ending, it is clear that the
owners of existing power plants will have a very large hand in
writing it. A final example of grandfathering in land uses is the
common practice in local land use regulations of permitting variances
and nonconforming uses; in cases of hardship, these permit
deviations from general land use plans that are otherwise binding on

127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and
Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 1677 (2007) (examining grandfathering in the context of environmental legislation
and regulations).
129. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also
supra text accompanying note 93.
130. Clean Air Act §§ 165(a)(4), 173(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(4), 7503(a)(2) (2000).
131. It was also argued that installing pollution control equipment was much more
efficiently done at the new construction stage, rather than patched on at some point in the
middle of a plant’s life. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTERIM REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON CHANGES IN NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAMS FOR STATIONARY SOURCES OF
AIR POLLUTANTS 35 (2005), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309095786/html/
(“Supporters assert that it is justified because new sources can most easily incorporate the
latest pollution control technology.”).
132. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., THE CHALLENGE FOR FEDERAL AND STATE
REGULATORS: TRANSITION FROM REGULATION TO EFFICIENT COMPETITION IN ELECTRIC
POWER 33 (1995) (on file with author).
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all other parties in their future land use changes and
developments.133
What lawmakers typically anticipate is that over the course of
time, the grandfathered nonconformers will gradually phase
themselves out and new entrants in compliance will replace them.134
To an extent, this happens. However, some grandfathering situations
have seen nonconformers hang on for unexpectedly long periods of
time.135 Grandfathering under New Source Review and the 1977
amendments still excuse pre-1977 polluters from upgrading or even
installing pollution control equipment, with the result that many
power plants that were old and polluting in 1977 are now archaic and
still polluting.136 In the meantime, what of the beneficiaries of new
environmental laws and regulations? The pollution that is emitted as
a result of the 1977 grandfathering continues to affect unidentifiable
victims, and the reduced ability to regulate land uses is continuing to
allow development to intrude into wildlife habitat, threatening
biological diversity.
Grandfathering is a tool for dealing with legal transitions, which
bring together stakeholders in the transition. However, it should be
no surprise that the stakeholders most vocal and defensive about
transitions are those that would be disadvantaged by them.
Grandfathering is a common policy response to these stakeholders.
Of course, this comes at the expense of the unidentifiable, those that
would benefit from not grandfathering existing investments into
older, weaker laws or regulations.
Why are liberal democratic societies so adamant about protecting
people’s expectations to continue doing what they were doing before a
new law or regulation? It is an insufficient answer to say that
liberalism emphasizes individual autonomy and rights and is most
interested in protecting individuals from state oppression, and
therefore protects people from regulation that they do not foresee.137
We certainly impute knowledge of the criminal law, new and old, to
individuals and do not excuse crimes for lack of actual knowledge.138
In environmental and land use regulations, there is a strong
133. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 974-99 (5th ed. 2002).
134. BRUCE BIEWALD ET AL., GRANDFATHERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMPARABILITY:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AIR EMISSION REGULATIONS AND ELECTRICITY MARKET
DISTORTIONS 2 (1998); Shi-Ling Hsu, Reducing Emissions from the Electricity Generation
Industry: Can We Finally Do It?, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 427, 435 (2001).
135. Hsu, supra note 126, at 10097.
136. Hsu, supra note 134, at 434-35.
137. See discussion infra notes 226-45 and accompanying text.
138. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (“If the ancient maxim that
‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ has any residual validity, it indicates that the ordinary
intent requirement—mens rea—of the criminal law does not require knowledge that an act
is illegal, wrong, or blameworthy.”).
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compulsion to grandfather because those affected by regulation are
apt to be few and identifiable, while those that might benefit from
regulation are many, diverse, and unidentifiable. While criminal
laws protect a larger society—but also more visibly protect
identifiable victims (we can all recall specific friends or relatives that
have been victims of crime, if not ourselves)—environmental and
natural resource laws protect unidentifiable persons. Moreover,
recall that identifiability can be a double-edged sword. People are
more willing to punish identifiable persons that engage in
wrongdoing.139 Criminal laws help effectuate this impulse, while
environmental and land use regulations that pick on individuals or
groups engaged in otherwise lawful activity evoke the “helpfulness”
identifiability bias, giving rise to an almost irresistible instinct to
grandfather.
A final irony is that while grandfathering is viewed as protecting
economic investments, the competitive advantage afforded to existing
polluters often retards economic progress. Because grandfathering is
a legal exemption, it is a valuable asset and a competitive advantage
over new entrants that do not enjoy the exemption. Several empirical
studies have demonstrated that the grandfathering of old emissions
standards has retarded capital turnover in the power plant
industry,140 in automobiles,141 and in four air-polluting industries.142
Since older facilities tend to pollute more, the slowing of capital
turnover certainly increases pollution;143 but the economic irony is
that it also makes the industry less economically efficient. Older
facilities are simply less efficient than newer ones.144
A compelling case in point is the electricity generating industry.
In the 1990s, the economics of new power plant construction was
such that natural gas-powered plants were much more economical

139. See Small & Loewenstein, supra note 28.
140. Michael T. Maloney & Gordon L. Brady, Capital Turnover and Marketable
Pollution Rights, 31 J.L. & ECON. 203 (1988). But see Frank M. Gollup & Marc J. Roberts,
Environmental Regulations and Productivity Growth: The Case of Fossil-Fueled Electric
Power Generation, 91 J. POL. ECON. 654 (1983); Randy A. Nelson et al., Differential
Environmental Regulation: Effects on Electric Utility Capital Turnover and Emissions, 75
REV. ECON. & STAT. 368 (1993) (casting some doubt on the methodology of Maloney and
Brady, but reaching a similar conclusion).
141. Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: The Case of Auto Emissions
Standards, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 328 (1982).
142. Randy Becker & Vernon Henderson, Effects of Air Quality Regulations on
Polluting Industries, 108 J. POL. ECON. 379 (2000).
143. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR POLLUTION: EMISSIONS FROM OLDER
ELECTRICITY GENERATING UNITS 2 (2002).
144. Id.; TINA KAARSBERG ET AL., NORTHEAST-MIDWEST INST., THE CLEAN AIRINNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY LINK: ENHANCING EFFICIENCY IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 30
(1999) (“Engine efficiency has accelerated from 30 percent in the 1940s to as high as 50
percent.”), available at http://www.nemw.org/Section2.pdf .
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than coal-fired power plants.145 Deregulated natural gas prices were
low, making natural gas-fired power plants cheaper.146 Meanwhile,
for coal-fired power plants the cost of controlling emissions of sulfur
dioxide by installing “scrubbers,” or flue gas desulfurization
equipment, was high.147 However, the 1990s saw the retirement of
only seven of the original 263 coal-fired plants originally subjected to
new regulation under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.148 Why so
few, when Congress expected that the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments would finally put many of the coal-fired dinosaurs to
rest?149 The answer is that Congress underestimated the power of the
economic incentives they had created—by grandfathering—for power
plants to be patched up and kept running. Legislating an expensive
regulatory pollution control requirement that only applied to new
construction created an enormous incentive to maintain existing,
grandfathered plants.
The identifiability bias thus has an economic side as well. While
legislatures respond to the call of identifiable constituents that
demand grandfathering of their polluting facilities, they ignore the
economic interests of new entrants. New entrants invariably have a
more efficient way of producing what incumbents produce; otherwise
they would not be seeking to enter the industry. Because of the
substantial overlap of environmental and economic interests, the
story of grandfathering in the electricity generating industry not only
illustrates the identifiability bias against environmental protection,
but also economic progress.
B. Bias in the Judiciary – Standing
The question of standing has long been a prickly one for
environmental plaintiffs. Article III of the Constitution requires
federal judges to carefully consider whether a plaintiff is the proper
party to seek relief before a court.150 In order to establish standing to
sue, a plaintiff must show:

145. Hsu, supra note 134, at 434-35.
146. Michael C. Blumm et al., Beyond the Parity Promise: Struggling to Save Columbia
Basin Salmon in the Mid-1990s, 27 ENVTL. L. 21, 100 (1997).
147. See, e.g., A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID
RAIN PROGRAM 241-42 (2000) (reviewing in 2000 the state of scrubber cost and technology
and noting advances in the late 1990s in both reducing cost and improving efficiency).
148. Hsu, supra note 134, at 435.
149. BIEWALD ET AL., supra note 134, at 2.
150. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (“The ‘gist of the question of standing’ is
whether the party seeking relief has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.’ ” (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))).

466

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:433

(1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.151

All three of these elements have posed problems for environmental
plaintiffs, who have often complained of diffuse, uncertain injuries—
injuries that are not traceable to specific injurers—and injuries that
have numerous causes, so that they may not be redressable. All three
of these elements pose identifiability problems. This is not to say that
the standing doctrine is misguided—but it is important to recognize
its systemic propensity to filter out environmental lawsuits, so that
appropriately narrow solutions can be fashioned.
1. Injury in fact
In the seminal 1972 case Sierra Club v. Morton,152 the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a complaint by the Sierra
Club on the grounds that it had not alleged that a planned ski resort
development would result in an “injury in fact” to actual members of
the Sierra Club.153 The decision was deemed to be something of a
victory for the environmental movement because of the recipe laid
out in the opinion for meeting standing requirements,154 and because
the Sierra Club was granted leave to amend its complaint to meet
those requirements, which they did;155 the Sierra Club’s persistence
ultimately helped derail the proposed ski resort.156 However, the case
represents a major turning point for environmental litigation in that
it placed an enduring burden on plaintiffs to show legally cognizable
harm, insisting on “concrete and particularized,” and “actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” harm.157 For most
environmental or ecological harms, which tend to be widespread and
diffuse, it is difficult to identify a specific plaintiff or group of persons
whom have suffered “concrete and particularized” harm.158 Also, the
151. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 18081 (2000).
152. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
153. Id. at 734-36, 741.
154. But see Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins: The Geographic Nexus in
Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (1996) (noting that the Sierra Club had
used a more “globalist” approach to environmental standing).
155. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 348 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
156. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 980 (4th ed. 2003).
157. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180
(2000).
158. See, e.g., Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 667-68 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(finding no particularized harm where plaintiffs challenged failure of Internal Revenue
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nature of some environmental lawsuits are such that they seek to
prevent some future harm, so that courts might look skeptically at
whether the harm is “actual or imminent.”159 As Justice Kennedy
wrote in his concurring opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the
Court will not “entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public’s
nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.”160
Why is this an identifiability problem? “Concrete and
particularized” injuries occur to people that are concrete and
particularized. Unidentifiable individuals are exposed to substantial
risks that courts have not deemed to be “actual and imminent”
injuries. The nature of environmental harm is such that it rarely
attaches to such identifiable individuals, but only populations of
individuals. Two of the theories of identifiability illustrate how this
doctrine biases against environmental protection: the diffuse and
widespread nature of environmental or ecological harms make the
reference group necessarily large, reducing the human compulsion to
act; and the proactive nature of most environmental lawsuits renders
relief ex ante rather than ex post, making relief or preventative
action seem less compelling.
In its recent decision in Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency,161 the Court seems to have retreated somewhat
from the restrictive Lujan approach, albeit by a narrow 5-4 majority.
Importantly, the Court upheld standing in a case involving the EPA’s
refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, which is perhaps the
quintessential environmental problem in that it involves diffuse and
unidentifiable plaintiffs, diffuse and unidentifiable defendants, and
latency and causation issues. Nevertheless, in focusing upon
Massachusetts as lead plaintiff, the Court held that Massachusetts,
as a “quasi-sovereign,”162 had suffered injury-in-fact by virtue of its
Service to carry out environmental impact statement for tax treatment of methyl tertiary
butyl ether).
159. See Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L.
REV. 897, 945-68.
160. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992). Justice Kennedy
concurred:
While it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the
challenged action, the party bringing suit must show that the action
injures him in a concrete and personal way. This requirement is not just
an empty formality. It preserves the vitality of the adversarial process
by assuring both that the parties before the court have an actual, as
opposed to professed, stake in the outcome, and that “the legal questions
presented . . . will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a
debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”
Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
161. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
162. Id. at 1454. Justice Stevens wrote that “[j]ust as Georgia’s ‘independent interest . .
. in all the earth and air within its domain’ supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so
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“interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the
earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether
its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants
shall breathe pure air.”163 The Court continued: “That Massachusetts
does in fact own a great deal of the ‘territory alleged to be affected’
only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this
case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial
power.”164
That the Court found injury-in-fact and upheld standing for
climate change risks is a very significant victory for
environmentalists and a noteworthy development in standings
jurisprudence.165 However, in terms of environmental law, one must
not lose sight of the fact that it was the state of Massachusetts that
was deemed to have standing, and largely by virtue of the fact that it
“own[ed] a great deal” of the territory threatened by climate
change.166 Would the same result have been obtained for an
individual? Or a public interest organization? The Court evidently
felt it necessary to assert that “[o]nly one petitioner needs to have
standing to authorize review,”167 leaving us to wonder if the
environmental organization Environmental Defense, a plaintiff to
the suit, would have had standing had it brought the suit alone.
That an “injury-in-fact” requirement, even in light of
Massachusetts v. EPA, will still be a gatekeeper for now and forever
is an identifiability bias. The bias exists in the difficulty of
identifying people that suffer the kinds of injuries caused by
environmental degradation, as compared with the ease of identifying
people that suffer economic injuries supposedly caused by
environmental regulation. In this sense, the bias is a structural one,
reflecting a bias of our political and constitutional values, and
favoring tangible, economic harms over less tangible, less
measurable harms. And it is worth bearing in mind that in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court was swayed by what is now a
mountain of evidence raising the probability that the accumulation of

too does Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory today.” Id.
(citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
163. Id. (citing Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237).
164. Id.
165. Before Massachusetts v. EPA, the question had been one of great interest among
academics, especially given Judge Sentelle’s concurring opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA,
415 F.3d 50, 59-61 (2005). See Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury
to All Injury to None?, 35 EVNTL. L. 1 (2005).
166. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454. “Because the Commonwealth owns a
substantial portion of the state’s coastal property, it has alleged a particularized injury in
its capacity as a landowner.” Id. at 1456 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
167. Id. at 1441 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.
547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006)).
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greenhouse gases poses substantial risks.168 Had this suit been
brought just ten years ago when the science of climate change was
quite alarming but not as conclusive—remember that the 1987
Climate Protection Act required EPA to develop a national policy169—
it is far from clear that the same result with respect to standing
would have been obtained. It is the nature of the “facts” which need
to seem plausible to establish “injury-in-fact” that act as the court
gatekeeper and that keep out some environmental lawsuits that
should be heard.
2. Traceability to Action of Defendant
The second requirement of the standing test, that an injury be
traceable to the defendant, is really an unidentifiability problem: it is
very often impossible for victims of pollution or other environmental
or ecological insult to identify their perpetrators. Air and water
pollution usually have many emitters, ecological degradation and
wildlife habitat loss, many infringers. Identifying them and tracing
them to an alleged injury is an essential pleading requirement.
Modern realities may have eroded the traceability bar. The
seminal tort case Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories170 created a “market
share” theory of liability that enables plaintiffs to hold defendants
liable for a defective product in proportion to the defendants’ market
shares, if the product in question is produced by all defendants in
accordance with the same formula.171 This theory of liability, while
sometimes questioned,172 has nevertheless held up over time. In
Agency for Health Care Administration v. Associated Industries of

168. See id. at 1446. The first paragraph of Justice Stevens’s opinion is:
A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a
significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related. For
when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it acts like the
ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape
of reflected heat. It is therefore a species—the most important species—
of a “greenhouse gas.”
Id. Justice Stevens’s opinion goes on to survey the many climate change reports and
studies over several decades submitted by plaintiffs, and concludes in its holding on
standing that “petitioners’ submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the
most demanding standards of the adversarial process. EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both actual and
imminent.” Id. at 1455 (internal quotations omitted).
169. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
170. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
171. Id. at 936-38.
172. See, e.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990); City of Chicago v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Skipworth by Williams v. Lead
Indus. Ass’n, 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984).
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Florida, Inc.,173 the Florida Supreme Court upheld a state statute’s
allowance of a market-share theory of liability as applied to tobacco
manufacturers,174 permitting plaintiffs to recover against the
defendants based on defendants’ market share in tobacco products.175
A possible extension of Sindell and Agency for Health Care
Administration would be to impose liability on polluters based on a
share of pollution.176 It is conceivable that a statutorily created cause
of action for pollution share liability would similarly be upheld. This
would require, however, that there be some linearity between
pollution and harm, and that, as in the case of some air pollutants,
there be fairly extensively and deeply studied pollutants such as fine
particulate matter.177
As a general matter, the traceability prong of the standing inquiry
remains a hurdle. Courts have shown some willingness to entertain
novel theories on liability such as market share liability, even if
courts have indicated a willingness to defer to legislatures in creating
statutory remedies. However, the traceability prong still seems very
important from a due process point of view. In that sense, this
requirement, in that it reflects a fundamental value of our notion of
justice, is a structural identifiability bias. Again, this is not to say
that it is misplaced. But insofar as the traceability requirement
systematically filters out environmental lawsuits, it is a bias that
requires that the doctrine of standing be tweaked.
3. Redressability
The standing requirement that a plaintiff suffer a harm that is
redressable is, in some ways, another way of establishing
causation,178 and as such, poses an identifiability bias. The way that
the redressability requirement biases environmental law is similar to
the way that the traceability requirement does: it filters out claims in
which the link between polluter and victim is probabilistic or
statistical in nature. Redressability is an even finer filter, however.
Not only must there be some sort of a link between polluter and
victim, but the claim must be such that the court can afford a remedy
173. 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996). Significantly, the court stated in dicta that joint and
several liability was also possible, although not as a concurrent theory with market-share
liability. Id. at 1256-57.
174. Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, FLA. STAT. § 409.910 (1995).
175. Agency for Health Care, 678 So. 2d at 1255-56. This scheme served as a template
for tobacco liability in many other states, as well as in the Canadian province of British
Columbia. British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco, [2005] S.C.R. 49.
176. Shi-Ling Hsu & Austen L. Parrish, Litigating Canada-US Transboundary Harm:
International Environmental Lawmaking and the Threat of Extraterritorial Reciprocity, 48
VA. J. INTL. L. 1, 41-45 (2007).
177. See supra note 46.
178. Mank, supra note 165, at 27.

2008]

THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS

471

to the victim.179 With truly widespread pollution problems, such as
global climate change, the difficulty of identifying not only the
victims but also the defendants is manifest.
Enter Massachusetts v. EPA.180 In holding that the EPA’s refusal
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles, which
account for about six percent of global carbon dioxide emissions,181
was a redressable harm, the Court swept away much of the
identifiability bias embodied in the redressability requirement.
Significantly, the Court held that “regulating motor-vehicle
emissions will not by itself reverse global warming, [but] it by no
means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a
duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.”182 Apparently, redressability
no longer means that the court must be able to afford the plaintiff a
complete remedy, something that would be impossible in most
environmental disputes.
Before celebrating the victory for environmentalists, it is worth
noting the reliance of the Court on the Clean Air Act’s judicial review
provision, which provides a right to petition for review of a long list
of administrative transgressions.183 The Court wrote that “a litigant
to whom Congress has accorded a procedural right to protect his
concrete interests . . . here, the right to challenge agency action
unlawfully withheld . . . can assert that right without meeting all the
normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”184 The Court
perhaps consciously limits its holding to those situations where
Congress has spoken—and has by statute pronounced that some
environmental harms shall be considered redressable. While most
other federal environmental statutes provide rights to seek judicial
review of administrative decisions or to bring citizen suits to enforce
non-discretionary lapses of administration,185 injuries not connected
with a federal statute may not be considered redressable if, as is the
case for most environmental injuries, the injurers are many and
therefore unidentifiable.
4. Standing Requirements: A Filter as a Structural Bias
Standing has been historically important in filtering out lawsuits
with many plaintiffs on the theory that no single plaintiff can
179. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-63 (1992).
180. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
181. Id. at 1458.
182. Id.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006).
184. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
185. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. §1365 (2000); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2000);
Toxic Substances Control Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 2618 (2000); Toxic Substances Control Act
§§ 207(e)-207(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2647(e)-2647(f) (2000).
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adequately represent the interests of everyone and no court can
adequately adjudicate the rights of so many not appearing before
it.186 From one constitutional perspective, one championed by Justice
Scalia,187 legislatures are the appropriate bodies to deal with such
questions, being elected bodies and having at their disposal greater
fact-finding resources.188 Under this view, an identifiability bias
against widespread environmental harm is an appropriate reflection
of our notions of judicial modesty and judicial economy—notions that
are fundamental to our separation of powers.
But certainly the judiciary is not meant to punt all of these types
of questions to legislatures. For one thing, the entire corpus of
administrative law pertains to adjudications that, in some way, affect
large classes of individuals with potentially disparate sets of
interests, environmental interests being one of them.189 The question
then becomes to what extent our notions of judicial modesty and
judicial economy conflict with our notion of the universality of
justice.
The Court itself has wondered whether standing is truly a
constitutional bar or a rule of self-restraint which, if counterbalanced
by sufficiently compelling policy considerations, could be broken.190
Even Justice Roberts, in his scathing dissent in Massachusetts v.
EPA, acknowledges so much, complaining that the Court had created
“SCRAP [U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures] for a new generation,”191 which has become “emblematic
not of the looseness of Article III standing requirements, but of how
utterly manipulable they are if not taken seriously as a matter of
186. For example, in class action lawsuits, plaintiffs “must allege and show that they
personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified
members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.” Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975).
187. Justice Scalia is well known for his skepticism of environmental claims, denying
standing to an environmental organization that had alleged actual injury to its members
because the allegations were not geographically specific enough, Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), and because the allegations did not include concrete, specific
plans to study an endangered species that was jeopardized by a challenged governmental
action, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
188. Mank, supra note 165, at 21-22 (citing, among others, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77;
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974)).
189. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 3 (4th ed. 1999).
190. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92 (1968); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure
Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255, 303 (1961).
191. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1471 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
412 U.S. 669 (1973)). The SCRAP case is considered of questionable precedential value. See
Lujan, 497 U.S. at 889 (“The SCRAP opinion, whose expansive expression of what would
suffice for § 702 review under its particular facts has never since been emulated by this
Court, is of no relevance here . . . .”).
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judicial self-restraint.”192 But if standing is just a rule of selfrestraint, how are courts to evaluate the tenuousness of claims for
standing purposes, and decide when to exercise self-restraint?
To answer this question, it is useful to repeat a thought exercise
posed earlier in this Article: what if we could actually name, see, and
identify certain victims of pollution the way that we can identify
victims of a plane crash? What if we knew, beforehand, the names of
30,000 individuals that would die in the coming year from air
pollution from power plants? What would we then demand of our
judicial system in terms of seeking redress? Would we not be in an
uproar if the judiciary simply demurred, “it’s not my job?”
Certainly, courts have not constricted standing in the way that
Justice Scalia had hoped.193 Rather, subsequent cases show some
openness in interpreting injury-in-fact.194 But courts have still been
skeptical of injuries to unidentifiable individuals. As Professor Robin
Kundis Craig has argued, courts have historically been unduly
skeptical of environmental claims, ironically “dissociating” public
health concerns with the concept of “injury.”195 Even when federal
statutes have specified public health objectives and health-based
standards,196 courts have often used the injury-in-fact inquiry to
search for private injury, seemingly bypassing any thought of public
injury.197 In so doing, one is tempted to conclude that some judges are
really just skeptical of links between pollution and public health, or
injury to anybody.198 If that is true, one wonders if a restrictive
standings analysis is really about judicial modesty or judicial hubris.
192. Id.
193. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Twenty-first Century, 25 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 28 (2007) (“The retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor also opens up the
possibility that the Court will revive Justice Scalia's long-standing campaign to restrict the
standing of environmental plaintiffs . . . .”).
194. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 183-84 (2000) (“[T]he affiant members’ reasonable concerns about the effects of those
discharges, directly affected those affiants’ recreational, aesthetic, and economic
interests.”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 582 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]e have no license to demean the importance of the interest that particular
individuals may have in observing any species or its habitat, whether those individuals are
motivated by esthetic enjoyment, an interest in professional research, or an economic
interest in preservation of the species.”); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671-72
(9th Cir. 1975); Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 61517 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
195. Craig, supra note 43, at 155.
196. Id. at 158-74.
197. Id. at 174-83.
198. Justice Scalia, who has campaigned vigorously for a restricted standing doctrine
for environmental plaintiffs (and realized such in Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan and Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation), nevertheless found it obvious that the Endangered
Species Act protected, within its zone of interests, the interests of regulated property
owners to be free of “needless economic dislocation produced by agency officials zealously
but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objectives.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 176-77 (1997). In another Endangered Species Act case, Scalia bitterly dissented from
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C. Bias in Administrative Agencies – Regulatory Reform
Regulatory agencies, as extensions of the executive branch of
government, are responsive to the same kinds of political pressures
as the executive. As in the case of legislative and judicial
identifiability biases, the less obvious and more troubling cases are
those in which an identifiability bias is formalized or made routine in
a way that permanently or systematically affects administrative
decisionmaking. For administrative agencies, laws and regulations
that institutionalize a preference for identifiable constituents are too
common and too inconspicuous to sound warning bells.
As noted in Part IV.C. above, Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
field officials have typically paid much more attention to identifiable
constituents—their
neighbors—than
unidentifiable
ones—
environmentalists—even if the latter are given a voice by
Washington D.C. lawmakers and bureaucrats. In fact, much of this
preference for local interests is written into regulations. Regulations
of grazing permits to private individuals utilizing federal public land
emphasize the need to “consult, cooperate, and coordinate with”
grazing permittees. BLM officials must “consult, cooperate, and
coordinate with” affected permittees whenever the bureau issues or
renews any lease,199 modifies the terms of any lease,200 adjusts
grazing boundaries,201 and certainly when it plans to implement a
reduction or a closure or partial closure of federally-leased
rangeland.202 This rigid adherence to a process guaranteeing access
to identifiable grazing permittees also guarantees that everyone else,
a majority ruling that certain land use prohibitions did not amount to a compensable
“taking” under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, opining that “[t]he Court’s
holding that the hunting and killing prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on private
lands imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin—not just upon the rich, but upon
the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national zoological use.” Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). Judge David Sentelle of the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit has similarly expressed disbelief that the ESA could possibly halt development
activity, writing in National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt that
we may take it as a given that the statute forbidding the taking of
endangered species can be used, provided it passes constitutional
muster, to prevent counties and their citizens from building hospitals
or from driving to those hospitals by routes in which the bugs
smashed upon their windshields might turn out to include the Delhi
Sands Flower-Loving Fly or some other species of rare insect. That
leaves the question for today as: by what constitutional justification
does the federal government purport to regulate local activities that
might disturb a local fly?
130 F.3d 1041, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
199. 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(b) (2006).
200. Id. § 4130.3-3(a).
201. Id. § 4110.2-4.
202. Id. § 4110.3-3. Interestingly, until 2006, this latter regulation also required the
consultation with “the interested public.” 43 C.F.R. § 4110.3-3 (1995).
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including the federal taxpayer, will be under-represented. Because
this is such a formalized, routine process, the identifiability bias is
more a matter of the structure of administrative decisionmaking
than a random effect on a random decisionmaker.
Access, participation, and transparency have always been
demanded from parties affected by administrative decisionmaking.
From the earliest days of the administrative state, there has been
steady pressure for reform, and it has typically taken the form of a
call for greater transparency and accountability.203 The
Administrative Procedure Act204 (APA), enacted in 1946, requires
federal agencies to follow a set procedure for rulemaking that
includes announcement of the proposed rulemaking,205 and an
opportunity for public comment206 at least thirty days before a final
rulemaking can be made and published.207 In 1990, Congress
provided a means of further liberalizing the rulemaking process,
passing the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990,208 which authorized
agencies to include regulated parties in the very process of
developing a rule, by creating “negotiated rulemaking committee[s]”
that would include not only agency officials but “significantly
affected” persons.209 The idea behind negotiated rulemaking was to
make the administrative rulemaking process less adversarial, more
cooperative, and more conducive to constructive information
sharing,210 goals that seemed difficult to quibble with.211
Of course, negotiated rulemaking provides greater transparency,
accountability, and greater representation—for identifiable parties.
It is telling that the preamble states that “[n]egotiated rulemaking,
in which the parties who will be significantly affected by a rule
participate in the development of the rule, can provide significant
advantages over adversarial rulemaking,” and that “[n]egotiated
203. David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and its Implications for
Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 7-19 (2005).
204. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006).
205. Id. § 553(b).
206. Id. § 553(c).
207. Id. § 553(d).
208. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-590 (1990).
209. 5 U.S.C. § 565 (1990).
210. The preamble to the Act includes findings such as “[a]gencies currently use
rulemaking procedures that may discourage the affected parties from meeting and
communicating with each other, and may cause parties with different interests to assume
conflicting and antagonistic positions and to engage in expensive and time-consuming
litigation over agency rules,” and “[a]dversarial rulemaking deprives the affected parties
and the public of the benefits of face-to-face negotiations and co-operation in developing
and reaching agreement on a rule . . . [and] deprives them of the benefits of shared
information, knowledge, expertise, and technical abilities possessed by the affected
parties.” Pub. L. No. 101-648. §§ 2(2), 2(3).
211. See William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1353 (1997)
(noting that virtually all of the academic literature was supportive of the Act).
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rulemaking can increase the acceptability and improve the substance
of rules, making it less likely that the affected parties will resist
enforcement or challenge such rules in court.”212 The question raised
by more skeptical scholars was, what about those not represented in
the negotiated rulemaking committees?213 As William Funk has
pointed out, it is odd that the Act contemplates participation in the
negotiated rulemaking process by “parties,” but there is no mention
of the public or its interest.214 Perhaps even more revealing, the Act
requires that the “convenor”—the person charged with assembling a
negotiated rulemaking committee—must ascertain the names of
persons who are willing and qualified to represent interests that will
be “significantly affected by [the] proposed rule, including residents
of rural areas.”215 Just who did Congress have in mind when the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act was drafted? “Residents of rural areas”
probably does not mean environmental organizations or public
interest organizations.
Following on the heels of negotiated rulemaking, the Clinton
administration, facing strong challenges from congressional
Republicans who sought to curb environmental and ecological
regulation, embarked upon a series of initiatives that it dubbed as
“regulatory reinvention.”216 The specific reinvention initiatives also
had catchy names, such as “Project XL,” “Habitat Conservation
Planning,” and “Brownfields redevelopment,” and each created a
somewhat formalized program of agency negotiation with regulated
and potentially regulated parties.217 Project XL was an initiative that
authorized the EPA to grant ad hoc waivers to regulated parties to
undertake activities if the EPA believed that the ultimate result
would be “superior environmental performance.”218 Habitat
Conservation Planning authorized the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
to grant incidental take permits under the Endangered Species Act if
a landowner facing ESA would agree to undertake supercompensatory mitigation measures to improve endangered species
212. Pub. L. No. 101-648 § 2(4-5) (emphases added).
213. Cf. Funk, supra note 211, at 1382-87 (“Thus, agencies are influenced to see their
role not as serving the public interest, but as generating a consensus among the parties to
the negotiation. Public choice theory is not resisted; it is adopted with a vengeance.” Id. at
1386.); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at
Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1211 (1994). (“[R]egulatory negotiation is not
democratically legitimate unless all interested parties are adequately represented.
Agreement among only the subset of interests that have organized advocates is not
sufficient.”).
214. Funk, supra note 211, at 1382-87.
215. 5 U.S.C. § 583(b)(2) (emphasis added).
216. Hsu, supra note 84, at 33.
217. See infra notes 218-19.
218. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects: XL Community Pilot Program, 60
Fed. Reg. 55569-02 (Nov. 1, 1995).
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habitat and if permitted actions will “not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of survival of the species in the wild.”219 The Brownfields
Redevelopment program allowed the EPA to grant a landowner
immunity under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act220 (CERCLA) if she agreed to
undertake some cleanup measures that might not otherwise be
required or undertaken.
All of these reinvention measures, developed in a congressional
climate that was decidedly hostile to government regulation and to
the Democratic Clinton administration, were responses to pressures
to make regulatory agencies more responsive and flexible.221 The
result was a regime of negotiation with regulated parties. The effect,
of course, was to formally and structurally grant access and a voice to
regulated parties. Environmental organizations, to the extent that
they represent the public interest of unidentifiable individuals, were
generally not at the table. And while there is no empirical evidence
that the regulatory bargains struck under reinvention programs
were systematically disadvantageous to the public interest,222 one
worries about the effect of having a whole system of essentially ex
parte negotiations.223
Administrative agencies make mistakes. The identifiability bias is
one class of errors that administrative agencies can make.
Stakeholders to administrative decisions thus demand some
transparency and even participation in order to protect themselves
from administrative error. Given the vast amounts of information
about any specific administrative dispute, it seems logical to open up
administrative decisionmaking processes to stakeholders. But this is
the crux of the structural identifiability bias. Just small amounts of
information about only some stakeholders are enough to influence
decisionmaking. In retrospect, it seems obvious: with increased
transparency and participation comes influence. Unidentified
individuals will never fully benefit from transparency or participate.

219. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2000).
220. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
221. Hsu, supra note 84, at 34.
222. Id. at 38-42.
223. See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous
Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 141-43 (1998).
Before Regulatory Reinvention, there was Negotiated Rulemaking, the regulatory practice
developed in the early 1990s to engage interested parties in a rulemaking before a rule is
drafted up and published for public comment by the agency. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter,
Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 32, 32 (2000). With this earlier experience as well, public interest
organizations were shut out and many worried that regulated agencies were being
hoodwinked by regulated parties. Funk, supra note 211, at 1371-74 (1997); RoseAckerman, supra note 213, at 1210.
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VI. WHY DO STRUCTURAL IDENTIFIABILITY BIASES FORM?
An extended discussion of liberalism and its influence on Western
democratic political systems is beyond the scope of this Article, but it
is worth a brief digression to illustrate why identifiability biases run
so deep and how systematic and unconscious this bias is against
environmental protection.
Liberalism, in all its various forms,224 has one defining
characteristic: a focus on the rights and autonomy of individuals.225
Americans, having adopted a Lockean liberalism,226 with its
particular concern with the protection of private property rights,227
have taken up in earnest this emphasis on individual rights, casting
224. A roster of “liberals” would include a very diverse list of political philosophers,
political scientists, and legal scholars from Locke, who is most frequently associated with
the ideal of private property rights protection, see, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT ch. XI, § 138 (1690) (“[T]he supreme power cannot take from any man any
part of his property without his own consent.”), to Rawls, best known for an unflagging
concern for those least well off, see, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971) (“All
social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—
are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is
to everyone’s advantage.”), and from Mill, a utilitarian, see, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL,
UTILITIARIANISM 10 (Bobbs-Merrill 1957) (“The creed which accepts as the foundation of
morals ‘utility’ or the ‘greatest happiness principle’ holds that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness.”), to Dworkin, a critic of utilitarianism, see, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at vii (Harvard Univ. Press, 2001) (“This is the theory of utilitarianism,
which holds that law and its institutions should serve the general welfare, and nothing
else . . . . The critical portions of these essays criticize both parts of the theory . . . .”).
Hence, as Rogers M. Smith has written, “[t]here was, of course, never any single,
authoritative version of liberalism.” ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (1985).
225. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 34 (1995) (“A liberal democracy’s most basic commitment is to the freedom and
equality of its individual citizens. This is reflected in constitutional bills of rights, which
guarantee basic civil and political rights to all individuals . . . .”); SMITH, supra note 224, at
14 (“Liberalism’s most distinctive feature is thus its insistence that government should be
limited so as to free individuals to undertake private as well as public pursuits of
happiness, even if this option erodes public spiritedness in practice.”).
226. Id. at 15 (“Locke is crucial . . . because the political philosophy of liberalism is
historically linked with a whole range of distinctive developments that are best
encompassed in his writings, such as parliamentary movements, new constitutional limits
on government, economic mercantilism and nascent capitalism.”); id. at 16 (“[Locke]
defines the principles liberals pursue; and Americans have always evaluated constitutional
doctrines and devices largely in terms of their serviceability for liberal ends.”); LAURENCE
H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 70-71 (1991)
(“Undoubtedly, one of the most influential thinkers for American statesmen of that era was
the seventeenth-century English political philosopher John Locke.”).
227. LOCKE, supra, note 224, Ch. VII, § 87 (“Man being born . . . with a title to perfect
freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of
Nature, equally with any other man . . . hath by nature a power . . . to preserve his
property - that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other
men.”); Id. Ch. IX, § 124 (“The great and chief end, therefore, of mens uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their
property.”); TRIBE & DORF, supra note 226, at 71 (“In his Second Treatise on Government,
Locke spelled out a natural rights theory of the origin of private property.”).
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most constitutional questions as one of state versus individual.228 In
privacy cases such as Olmstead v. United States,229 in which a liquor
trafficker contested a wiretapping-aided conviction on Fourth
Amendment grounds, one would expect a great judicial tussle over
the scope of individual rights. In an enduring dissent, Justice
Brandeis declared that the Constitution conferred on individuals, “as
against the government, the right to be let alone . . . .”230 But even in
seemingly purely economic cases such as Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota,231 a railroad rate regulation case, the
Court took on a palpable individual rights focus, upholding plaintiffs’
complaint that unfavorable freight tariffs were “pro tanto a taking
and depriv[ed] the company of its property without due process of
law.”232 In McCulloch v. Maryland,233 the Court actually wondered if
the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause234 authorized the
federal government to establish a national bank of the U.S., even in
the wake of a five-year period of brutal inflation and economic chaos.
Private banks feared, and the Court feared for them, that the federal
bank would simply be a profit-making corporation with a competitive
advantage by virtue of being free from state taxation.235 Even the
very nature of the U.S. Constitution—that of enumerated, not
inherent, powers and authorizing the federal government to act only
within the ambit of the enumerated powers236—is a basis for limiting
federal governmental action.

228. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (2d ed. 1988) (“That all
lawful power derives from the people and must be held in check to preserve their freedom
is the oldest and most central tenet of American constitutionalism.”). The question of
“regulatory takings” has clearly been couched in terms of the power of the state to take
versus constitutional protections of private property. Constitutional law scholar Richard
Epstein, in his book on regulatory takings of property, writes
This book is an extended essay about the proper relationship between
the individual and the state. . . . The question of governance is how the
natural rights over labor and property can be preserved in form and
enhanced in value by the exercise of political power, defined by Locke “to
be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all
less penalties, for regulating and preserving of property, and of
employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws . . . .”
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 3
(1985).
229. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
230. Id. at 478.
231. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
232. Id. at 440-41.
233. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
234. “Congress shall have [the] Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
235. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 536-38
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) (discussing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)).
236. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 118 (5th ed. 1995).
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In focusing upon the constant power struggle between individuals
and states, however, this liberal perspective deflects attention from
the beneficiaries of state action. State action is always undertaken
with some public benefit in mind, even if public choice theorists
would view it with skepticism. In fact, this skepticism, itself a
product of a focus on individual rights, has been incorporated into
institutions, practices, and doctrines in a way that guarantees a level
of protection of property and economic rights. The protection of the
right “to be let alone” has become such a basic instinct in public
policy that it has structurally protected all manner of activities and
land uses that produce environmental externalities.
Take for example the pervasive practice of grandfathering, which
derives inspiration from Article I, section 9 of the Constitution, which
provides that “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.”237 This prohibition on ex post facto regulation applies to
criminal prosecutions, not environmental regulations,238 but the
Constitutional enshrinement of such a prohibition is a strong signal
to lawmakers that our system of government very reluctantly
imposes hardships by virtue of changes in law. No grandfathering
statute has specifically invoked Locke, but who can miss the obvious
motivation of protecting property and economic rights, especially
those activities that are economically productive in nature, those
that “mix” labor with property?239
So, too, with regulatory reform, there is always an animating
theme of protecting important property and economic rights from
administrative action, a theme dating back to the Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota case.240 In a legal
system in which administrative adjudications are becoming more and
more important, liberal instincts ensure that individual rights are
not trampled by arbitrary and capricious administrative action. So
providing “accountability” from administrative agencies and greater
“access” for regulated parties are goals that are clearly driven by
liberal instincts to protect property and economic rights in the face of
237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
238. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 299 (1866).
239. Locke famously theorized that ownership of property can come about by mixing
one’s labor with property. LOCKE, supra note 224, § 20. Locke is most often and ardently
invoked by civil libertarians advocating for smaller government, but there is literature
suggesting that Locke himself might not have been as enthusiastically libertarian. Locke
was more interested in an “ordered” liberty—meaning protection for the landed gentry,
rather than for the masses, and Locke recognized the need for strong governmental
authority to preserve that order. See, e.g., David DeGroot, The Liberal Tradition and the
Constitution: Developing a Coherent Jurisprudence of Parental Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1287, 1296-99 (2000) (noting that Locke also wrote, in addition to his famous passages on
individual rights, that “every particular man must part with his right to his liberty and
entrust the magistrate with as full a power over all his actions as he himself hath”).
240. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
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an ever-expanding administrative state. Even the notion of
separating the central powers of federal government, inspired by
Montesquieu,241 has as its goals the prevention of accumulation of
federal power and the protection of individual rights.242 Hence, even
the doctrine of standing, a key separator of powers in the federal
government, can be traced to a liberal concern for individual rights.
Of course, liberals have a ready answer: an important part of the
liberal state is the harm principle, which calls for governmental
action to prevent harm to some individuals within the state.243 But
“harm,” as Albert Lin has noted, is an extremely difficult notion to
wrestle down when one speaks of environmental harms.244 Here is
where liberals fail the environment: relying upon the amorphous
harm principle as the sole justification for any infringement of
individual rights creates an inherent inertia. In effect, environmental
causes have been saddled with the burden of proof, and proof is often
hard to come by in environmental cases. If the requirement is to
produce a victim and a concrete harm, the environmental side is at a
severe disadvantage because of the inherent difficulty of identifying
victims. The less identifiable an individual is, the less concrete the
harm.
If a legal system is established that presumptively honors the
exercise of individual liberty and individual rights, but is willing to
entertain grievances of harm imposed by one upon another, great
importance is attached to the characterization of the harm. So what
if, as in the case of many environmental harms, the harm is difficult
to prove and difficult to attach to identifiable individuals? Herein lies
the irony of the Dworkin class of liberals, who subscribe to Dworkin’s
concept of rights as “trumps”245 in order to correct power imbalances.
The irony is that those powerful and narrow interests that are the
source of governmental failure have much more adroitly exploited
the “rights” concept than have any public interest organizations,
particularly environmental ones.

241. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 152 (Franz Neumann ed.,
Thomas Hugent, trans., Hafner Press 1949) (“Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary
power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the
judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might
behave with violence and oppression.”).
242. TRIBE, supra note 228, at 2-3.
243. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Classics
1974) (1859) (“That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”).
244. Lin, supra note 159, at 921.
245. Ronald Dworkin famously wrote that rights are “political trumps held by
individuals.” DWORKIN, supra note 224, at xi.
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VII. COUNTERING THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS
A. The Occasional Environmental Bias
Those advocating on behalf of environmental causes have not
missed out completely on the identifiability effect. Occasionally, an
environmental catastrophe occurs that draws attention to a specific,
identifiable group of persons. In such circumstances, sympathy for
identifiable victims, and sometimes outrage at identifiable polluters,
creates a groundswell for change and overwhelms any legislative or
executive resistance. These are the occasional identifiability biases in
favor of environmental protection.
In the mid-1970s, fifty-five-gallon drums of toxic waste began
surfacing in the Niagara Falls community of Love Canal.246 Heavy
rains had caused landfill caps to erode, and property that had been
used as a toxic chemical disposal site spilled contaminants into an
entire neighborhood.247 Within the course of a week in April of 1978,
New York State Health Commissioner Robert Whalen declared the
area a public health threat. By August, Whalen had ordered the
evacuation of all women and children in the area; New York
Governor Hugh Carey announced the state purchase of 238 homes in
the area and the evacuation of all residents; and President Jimmy
Carter dispatched federal funding to assist in the relocation and
clean-up.248 Media attention was intense and no doubt drove
legislative and executive impulses to act decisively. The result was
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA)249 or “Superfund” law, which passed in the
House of Representatives by a vote of 351 to 23 and was adopted by
the Senate two months later, becoming law on December 11, 1980.250
It has been argued that the “availability heuristic”251 explains the
unusual decisiveness on the part of state and federal lawmakers.
This probably accounts for some of the momentum for legislation, but
not all of it. Media frenzies never last more than a few weeks, but
this account played out over the course of at least two years,
culminating in the law’s passage in 1980. Identifiability provides a
more enduring explanation for the continued interest in passing
Superfund. The media frenzy died down, but the words “Love Canal”
will forever conjure up a memory of what happened to a group of
people. In addition to reducing the reference group size to that of a
246. University
at
Buffalo
Libraries,
Love
Canal
@
25
Exhibit,
http://ublib.buffalo.edu/libraries/asl/exhibits/lovecanal.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
250. See Library of Congress, THOMAS, H.R. 7020, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d096:HR07020:@@@X.
251. Jolls et al., supra note 32, at 1520-22, and accompanying text.
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community of several thousand residents, the Love Canal story was
successful because most Americans could identify, and identify with,
the middle-class residents of Love Canal. Because media attention
was intense, images and footage of Love Canal residents and their
travails became familiar fare to the American TV-viewing public.
Even without environmental organizations driving a campaign, the
identifiability effect attached itself to the Love Canal story and
propelled it into history, as the genesis of one of the most important
and copied environmental statutes.252
Other events have similarly seized public attention and locked
focus onto a group of identifiable individuals in a way that has
produced reform or legislation. In the wake of the horrendous
tragedy in Bhopal, India, in which thousands of people were killed by
an accidental release of methyl isocyanite,253 and in the wake of an
eerily similar incident in West Virginia,254 Congress passed the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. The act
required firms with “extremely hazardous” substances to report their
possession to the EPA and to local authorities and to coordinate with
local authorities on emergency plans.255 In Canada, a scandalous
cover-up of an E. coli bacteria problem by local water officials caused
an outbreak in Walkerton, Ontario that killed seven people and
sickened thousands, some permanently,256 and this also led to a
number of regulatory and legislative changes throughout Canada.257
From time to time, these events affecting a specific population serve
as reminders of the human consequences of environmental
malfeasance.
What about structural obstacles to remedying environmental
harms? Can environmental plaintiffs overcome standing obstacles,
for instance? Occasionally, environmentalists can find an identifiable
252. CERCLA has been copied by jurisdictions throughout the world. A number of
states have their own “Superfund statutes.” See Ronald G. Aronovsky, Back from the
Margins: An Environmental Nuisance Paradigm for Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 84
DENV. U. L. REV. 395, 424 (2006). Most recently, the province of British Columbia passed
the B.C. Environmental Management Act, which contains provisions that are, in many
places, identical to the language of CERCLA. Michael J. Robinson-Dorn, The Trail Smelter:
Is What’s Past Prologue? EPA Blazes a New Trail for CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 233,
310 (2006).
253. Joseph J. Lisa, Negligence-Based Environmental Crimes: Failing to Exercise Due
Care Can be Criminal, 18 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 22 (2007).
254. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 156, at 483.
255. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000).
256. Canadian Man Jailed for Role in E. Coli Outbreak, EPOCH TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004,
http://english.epochtimes.com/news/4-12-20/25115.html.
257. DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY 18, 355 n.16 (2003) (noting the passage of the Ontario Safe Drinking Water
Act, 2002 S.O., ch. 32 (Can.), the Quebec Drinking Water Regulation, R.R.Q. ch. Q-2, r. 4.1
(2003), the Manitoba Drinking Water Safety Act, R.S.M., ch. 36, D-101 (2002) (Can.), and
the Saskatchewan Environmental Management and Protection Act, 2002 S.S., ch. E-10.21
(Can.)).
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proxy for environmental harm, if there is a specific individual or
group that can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. The Inuit
people of Alaska and Northern Canada, whose way of life is highly
dependent upon the integrity of the Arctic ecosystem, constitute a
highly identifiable group of people.258 More importantly, however,
they may be said to be suffering a “concrete and particularized”
injury from global climate change.259 The National Snow and Ice Data
Center in Boulder, Colorado recently reported that the average sea
ice extent for September 2007 had shrunk to a shocking record low
that was 23 percent lower than the previous record for the month of
September, and that the Northwest Passage had opened for the first
time in recorded history.260 The 4th IPCC Assessment, released in
February 2007, made it quite clear that the shrinkage in Arctic sea
ice is the result of human activity.261 While there remains substantial
uncertainty about the specific effects of global climate change, almost
every credible projection includes a prediction that the Arctic Ocean
will become significantly warmer, floating sea ice will become much
more rare—probably disappearing during summers—and the entire
balance of life will be changed, with the result that the traditional
Inuit life that includes whaling and hunting would likely be

258. For Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) Chair and lead petitioner, Sheila WattCloutier, a petition and hearing is the latest of her attempts to leverage the identifiability
of her people to gain support for action on climate change. Petition of Sheila Watt-Cloutier,
Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from
Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United
States
(Watt-Cloutier
v.
U.S.)
(Dec.
7,
2005),
available
at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ICC_Petition_7Dec05.pdf [hereinafter ICC PETITION].
Long aware of the power of the identifiability of her people, she urged in a 2002 speech to
the Harvard Club of Ottawa that “climate change is not to Inuit solely an environmental or
even an[] economic issue, it is a matter of cultural health and survival. The media use
images of disappearing ice and thinner and fewer polar bears to characterize climate
change in the North. We need to give climate change a human face—an Inuit face.” Inuit
Circumpolar Council Conference, Inuit in Global Issues, Speaking at the Harvard Club,
Feb. 4, 2002, http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=78&Lang=En.
259. See, e.g., Rachel D’oro, Coastal Alaskans Face Physical, Cultural Erosion, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 27, 2006, at A6 (describing how the Inuit people of the coastal town of Newtok
have had to move for the second time in fifty years due to flooding and erosion, typical of
many Alaskan native villages—184 out of 213— that have been trying to adjust to warmer
temperatures, persistent flooding, and a dramatic shrinkage of sea ice and concomitantly
shorter hunting seasons).
260. Press Release, National Snow and Ice Data Center, Artic Sea Ice Shatters All
Previous Record Lows (Oct. 1, 2007), http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/
20071001_pressrelease.html.
261. 4TH IPCC, supra note 68, at 10. The observed widespread warming of the
atmosphere and ocean, together with ice mass loss, support the conclusion that it is
extremely unlikely that global climate change of the past fifty years can be explained
without external forcing, and very likely that it is not due to known natural causes alone.
Id. The 8.1% and 23.2% figures are derived by multiplying the IPCC estimates of 2.7% of
ice loss per decade by the three decades since 1978. Similarly, 23.2% is 7.4% times three.
Id. at 8.
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impossible.262 And that would in turn mean a breakup of the cultural
customs that are predicated upon a cold, frozen, climate.
While the interests of the Inuit do not coincide perfectly with that
of all humankind in reducing greenhouse gases, they overlap
sufficiently for the Inuit to be an effective proxy. A lawsuit brought
by Inuit peoples against those responsible for greenhouse gas
emissions would serve the dual purposes of vindicating a variety of
property rights of the Inuit263 and spurring the reduction of
greenhouse gases, to the benefit of everyone.264
B. More Systematic Fixes for the Identifiability Bias
The diffuse nature of most environmental harms means that the
pertinent reference group is large, and therefore not easily
identifiable, at least not as identifiable as a group that might be
harmed by regulation. If we are certain that this is true at least half
the time, then there exists a bias against environmental regulation.
Environmentalists will too often lose a people-based debate, more
often than if lawmakers were given information about unidentifiable
victims.
How, then, to counter the identifiability bias? This Article
proposes three types of strategies for curbing identifiability biases,
both incidental and structural. First, environmental lawmaking
should generally be drafted liberally with “absolute” terms, or terms
that provide environmental protection with a “trump.”265 Where there
262. See, e.g., DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
626 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing international consensus that greenhouse emissions were
having a substantial effect on the environment).
263. See, e.g., Nunavut Waters and Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal Act, 2002 S.C.,
ch. 10 (Can.), available at http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/LS/
371/c33-e.htm; Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, 1993 S.C., ch. 29 (Can.), available at
http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nunavut/index_e.html. The Nunavut Land Claims
Agreement, apart from creating a separate Canadian territory, was a settlement
agreement between the Inuit people and the government of Canada. See Preamble –
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nunavut/pre_e.html.
264. See Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation Through
the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). The Inuit
Circumpolar Conference (ICC), an organization representing the Northern Aboriginal
people of all Northern countries, has filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR) in Washington, D.C., a human rights branch group of the
Organization of American States. ICC PETITION, supra note 258. While the Commission
cannot issue any declarations with legal import, its findings of fact may have some
precedential value in a court of law, should lawsuit be brought. The IACHR initially
rejected the petition when it was filed in December 2005, but announced that it would
reconsider that decision, holding a hearing on March 1, 2007, to determine whether the
impacts of climate change constitute a human rights violation within the meaning of its
charter. See, e.g., Human Rights Body Reconsiders Inuit Climate Change Petition, CBC
NEWS,
Feb.
6,
2007,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/02/06/climatehearing.html.
265. Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in
Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410-11 (2005).
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is a legal provision that has as its purpose the protection of some
environmental good, discretion should be viewed as the enemy.
Discretion in environmental disputes has more often than not
resulted in some adjustment in favor of a regulated group.266 Second,
where absolutes are not appropriate or possible for political reasons
(and they will often not be), legislative and administrative action
should be more frequently guided by cost-benefit analysis. Costbenefit analysis still contains many flaws and is still susceptible to
manipulation. But it is less susceptible to manipulation than many
alternative decisionmaking tools, and it is entirely possible that a
good many of the flaws can be ameliorated with a set of “best
practices” or standards by which to evaluate the cost-benefit
analysis.267 Third, since environmental harm often affects large
groups, environmental claims should be brought, when possible, by
large groups. Whereas a small risk to an individual does not seem
like “harm” in the sense that a court is likely to entertain, a
substantial risk to members of a population is more likely to be
considered “harm.” Class action lawsuits are one way of addressing
diffuse environmental harms; a more general strategy of claim
aggregation, with attendant legal theories to support such claims, is
called for.
1. Curbing Discretion: The ESA
For all the trouble that the Endangered Species Act (ESA) has
been through, it is worth bearing in mind that in its application, it
has actually been quite consistent in its primary goal of preserving
biological diversity. Whatever one’s view on the ESA—and there are
certainly detractors268—few would argue that courts and
administrative agencies have been forced to pay some attention to
biological diversity because of the ESA. Few would have predicted
that the U.S. Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill269
would rule against the Tennessee Valley Authority and rule in favor
of protecting the habitat of the ugly, useless, three-inch-long snail
darter. Plaintiff’s attorney and now Professor Zygmunt Plater,
representing the snail darter and suing to stop completion of a dam
that would have destroyed the habitat of the snail darter, found
himself responding to a skeptical Justice Powell, who asked, “ ‘[w]hat
266. Id.
267. See Daniel H. Cole, Towards ‘Best Practice’ Standards in Environmental BenefitCost Analysis, at 3, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
918834#PaperDownload.
268. See Dirk Kempthorne, Governor of Idaho, RX for the ESA: The Endangered
Species Act at Thirty, in SPECIES PROTECTION AND THE LAW: ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT,
BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION, AND INVASIVE SPECIES CONTROL 223 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study Apr. 6-8, 2005).
269. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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are these fish good for, anyway? Can you eat them? Are they good for
bait?’ And isn’t that the question that everybody would want to ask?
Why stop a humongous hydroelectric dam for a stupid little
minnow?”270 As all environmental lawyers know, Plater was famously
successful in winning the case, but not in convincing Justice Powell,
who bitterly dissented, calling the cessation of construction of the
dam an “ ‘absurd result’—in the words of the District Court of this
case” and calling for the imposition of “common sense.”271 Chief
Justice Burger’s majority opinion, however, is the one that has
endured:
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision
whose terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the
Endangered Species Act. Its very words affirmatively
command all federal agencies “to insure that actions
authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize
the continued existence” of an endangered species . . . . This
language admits of no exception. . . . Concededly, this view of
the Act will produce results requiring the sacrifice of the
anticipated benefits of the project and of many millions of
dollars in public funds. But examination of the language,
history, and structure of the legislation under review here
indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered
species to be afforded the highest of priorities.272

Both Justice Powell’s dissent and Chief Justice Burger’s majority
opinion contain important lessons for drafters of future
environmental statutes. Justice Powell’s call for “common sense” is a
cautionary flag: common sense is code for subconsciously yielding to
some kind of identifiability bias.273 Common sense will invariably
draw people to looking at the tangible human aspects of
environmental decisionmaking, and for all the reasons set out in this
Article, will slant the decisionmaking in favor of the more tangible
humans.274
270. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Mercer University College of Law Virtual Guest Speaker
Program, Topic: The Snail Darter, The Tellico Dam, and Sustainable Democracy—Lessons
for the Next President from a Classic Environmental Law Controversy (Feb. 12, 2002),
http://www.law.mercer.edu/elaw/zygplater.html#lecture.
271. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 173-74 (citations omitted).
273. Although the Court was interested in the costs of the dam, it is worth
remembering that the costs are only meaningful because they signify some sort of tangible
human suffering. The Tellico Dam was part of a regional economic development plan, one
that would help create jobs in a chronically depressed Southeastern Tennessee economy.
Plater, supra note 270.
274. One wonders whether Justice Powell would have dissented as bitterly had the
plaintiffs found a way to emphasize the plight of the 340 farmers who had land in the area
to be flooded by the Tellico Dam and whose properties were taken to make way for the
dam. Professor Plater’s lecture contains some anecdotes about some of the more colorful
farmers that resisted the condemnation and subsequent dam construction. Id. Because of
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Chief Justice Burger’s opinion provides guidance on how to
counter the “common sense” identifiability bias. As Professor Plater
emphasized, the mandatory nature of the ESA—the fact that the
ESA provides that “[e]ach federal agency shall” ensure that its
actions do not jeopardize endangered species275 has made all the
difference. This is not to deny critics of the ESA that mandatory
provisions of this nature sometimes create their own escape
hatches;276 but no one can argue that the ESA, because of its
mandatory, discretion-curbing provisions, has not served as a
powerful impediment to the extinguishment of endangered species.
Mandatory or “absolute” provisions in legislation or regulations
can cure some identifiability biases. The ESA prevented the U.S.
Supreme Court from exercising a bias. Some biases, especially
structural ones, can be cured; a regulatory takings case—with a
constitutional question—would obviously trump even a statute with
mandatory provisions. But if public lands grazing reform were ever
to take place, surely some of the vast discretion that has been
conferred upon local BLM officials would be best replaced with
absolute provisions. For those cases in which the political stars are
aligned and there exists a mandate for true environmental reform,
the use of absolute provisions as environmental “trumps”277 would
have to be an important way of curbing the identifiability bias.
Particularly when there are irreversible environmental effects
involved—such as species extinction—some absolutism seems to be a
properly draconian form of environmental regulation. And even if
regulatory reform continues to soak into administrative
decisionmaking, it would certainly be possible to include some
absolute provisions into the rulemaking and regulatory negotiation
rules that protect environmental interests.
2. Curbing Discretion: NEPA
Another beacon for environmentalists is the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),278 one of the most copied statutes
in the world.279 One of the few parsimonious U.S. environmental
the formal eminent domain proceedings, however, the farmers had no real legal basis on
which to object. Id.
275. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added); Plater, supra note 270 (“Tell me
about the word ‘shall.’ If it were ‘may,’ nothing would have happened.”).
276. See Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The “Living
Constitution,” the Third Amendment, and the Endangered Species Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 769,
806 (2000) (describing how habitat conservation plans provided relief from the otherwise
absolute prohibitions of the ESA).
277. See Sinden, supra note 265, at 1484.
278. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
279. Percival estimates that over eighty countries and twenty-five states have adopted
some form of NEPA. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 156, at 783.

2008]

THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS

489

statutes, NEPA simply requires that federal agencies undertaking
federal actions (that would include permitting private parties to
undertake activities that fall under the jurisdiction of the agency)
conduct an assessment of the environmental impacts of the
activity.280 NEPA imposes no substantive obligations on an agency,281
and NEPA does not require that an agency “elevate environmental
concerns over other appropriate considerations.”282 Agencies enjoy a
fairly lenient “arbitrary, [or] capricious” standard of review under the
Administrative Procedure Act.283 But NEPA has bared its procedural
teeth often in its thirty-five year history, requiring agencies to go
back and repeat sloppily-done review processes and requiring
agencies to take into account information that it had failed to
consider the first time around.284 NEPA has even forced a federal
agency to backpedal on commitments made to a highly identifiable
aboriginal group on whaling rights because the agency did not
engage in an environmental review before making the
commitment.285
Like the ESA, NEPA has its own landmark improbable victories.
For NEPA, the case Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee, Inc. v.
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission286 was a watershed event. The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals required the Atomic Energy Commission to
not only perform an environmental impact statement pursuant to
NEPA, but also to take it into account in its decision as to whether to
license a nuclear power plant.287 To lawyers unfamiliar with
administrative law or environmental law, the holding seems
absurd—forcing the Atomic Energy Agency to look at and consider its
own reports seems like a surreal victory. Yet, forcing a very powerful
agency to go back and redo a lengthy decision process under NEPA
should not be trivialized. Although NEPA is “stunningly simple”—
forcing agencies to stop, consider, and disclose the environmental

280. National Environmental Policy Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
281. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519,
558 (1978).
282. Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
283. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1972).
284. See, e.g., Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985) (requiring the
consideration of environmental impacts of connected or related federal permitting
activities); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983)
(requiring consideration of information that was submitted by another federal agency and
rejecting an agency’s reliance on information that was known to be inaccurate); Calvert
Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (requiring the Atomic Energy Commission to actually consider a report on the
impacts of nuclear energy, rather than simply insert it in the administrative record).
285. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1145 (9th Cir. 2000).
286. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
287. Id. at 1128-29.
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impacts of a project288—the legislation has played an important role
in a number of major environmental cases.289 Because it has achieved
so much with so few words, it is hard not to admire NEPA’s
“genius.”290
By contrast, the Canadian experience with environmental
assessment provides an unfortunate example of what happens when
permitting agencies are vested with wide discretion with respect to
environmental impact assessments. While much of the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA)291 mimics NEPA, the
inconsistency in judicial applications robs the CEAA of its
effectiveness292 and certainly prevents it from acting as a bulwark
against identifiability bias.
In Friends of the West Country Ass’n v. Canada,293 a Canadian
Federal Court of Appeal294 held that the permitting agency had the
authority to determine the scope of a project for environmental
assessment purposes. The issue comes up in environmental
assessment cases in which a project proponent and a permitting
agency segment a project into different phases, aspects, or
components so as to make the environmental impacts seem small,
even if the cumulative impacts of the whole project are large. The
Federal Court of Appeal held, however, in an opinion by now
Supreme Court Justice Marshall Rothstein, that the permitting
agency responsible for the environmental assessment has wide
discretion to determine the scope of the project.295 This was an
incredible act of deference to the Canadian Coast Guard, which had
permitted the construction of two bridges without requiring it to
consider the cumulative effects of the bridges and the effects of the
logging road that necessitated the bridges or the logging operations
that would make use of the road and bridges.296 The environmental
assessments for both of the bridges simply stated that the scope of
the environmental assessment included the “site and downstream of
288. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (2002).
289. See, e.g., notes 269-72, 282-84 and accompanying text.
290. Karkkainen, supra note 288, at 904. William Rodgers describes NEPA as “[t]he
most admired of all the environmental laws . . . . It is admired for its form, its structure,
and its robustness. It is praised for its eloquence of formulation and for the cleverness in
the way it was attached to existing agency mandates.” William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most
Creative Moments in the History of Environmental Law: The “Whats,” 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 31.
291. 1992 S.C., ch. 37 (Can.).
292. See generally Andrew Green, Discretion, Judicial Review, and the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act, 27 QUEEN’S L.J. 785 (2002) (describing the vagueness of
the CEAA and the Federal courts’ lack of improvement of the situation).
293. [1998] 4 F.C. 340.
294. The Canadian equivalent of the U.S. federal court of appeals.
295. Friends of the West Country, [1998] 4 F.C. 340 at paras. 12-28.
296. Id. at paras. 2-5, 12.
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the bridge” and that the agency did not consider there to be any
cumulative effects, since the bridge would be “isolated from other
man-made structures by several kilometers.”297 No mention in either
assessment was made of the other bridge, or of the logging road or
subsequent logging operations.298 This case is on all fours with the
U.S. case Thomas v. Peterson,299 in which the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals invalidated an environmental assessment under NEPA that
considered the construction of a logging road in isolation of the
logging plan that had already been developed for the area. The
difference? The CEAA does not have, as NEPA does, binding
regulations on project scoping that mandates the inclusion of related
projects in an environmental assessment. Canadian courts have
given agencies wide latitude in determining what projects should be
included in scoping and environmental assessment.300
While NEPA can certainly be improved,301 it has been surprisingly
successful in compelling agencies to confront and consider
environmental effects that might otherwise be overlooked, even if no
substantive result is required. NEPA may not have been drafted with
unidentifiable individuals in mind, but it has been a great equalizer
in forcing agencies to consider the interests of those less obviously
affected by projects sponsored or permitted by federal agencies. And
the procedural-only mandates of NEPA only underscore the main
thesis of this Article—that what is most lacking is a sustained
attention on those indirectly, remotely, or less obviously affected by
projects having an impact on the environment.
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Curing structural identifiability biases requires structural reform,
which, given the deep liberal roots of Western political and legal
institutions, may be difficult. However, there is one structural reform
that seems to have gained at least a toehold in the public
policymaking realm: cost-benefit analysis. Although cost-benefit
analysis is caricatured by some as a stratagem for deregulation,302
297. Id. at para. 31.
298. Id.
299. 753 F.2d 754, 761 (9th Cir. 1985).
300. In Friends of the West Country, Justice Rothstein did, however, rule that the
Canadian Coast Guard abused its discretion in failing to take into account the cumulative
impacts of the other projects, even if they were not included in the scope of the review.
[1998] 4 F.C. 340 at paras. 30-40.
301. Brad Karkkainen has remarked that the NEPA process has often been “paper-rich
but information-poor,” noting that the procedural requirements have forced agencies to
produce documentation of their environmental considerations, rather than carefully taking
account of the environmental considerations themselves. Karkkainen, supra note 288, at
909-37.
302. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 41-60 (2004). Ralph Nader, in a tribute to the
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the use of cost-benefit analysis enjoys fairly bipartisan political
acceptance, with President Clinton’s adoption of the practice through
Executive Order 12866.303 President Clinton’s version of cost-benefit
analysis was considerably more flexible than President Reagan’s
original Executive Order 12291, which provided that for “major”
regulatory actions (defined as having an economic impact of $100
million or more),304 “[r]egulatory action shall not be undertaken
unless the potential benefits . . . outweigh the potential costs . . . .”305
By contrast, President Clinton’s executive order required agencies to
assess costs and benefits and would only propose or adopt a
regulation “upon a reasoned determination that the benefits . . .
justify its costs.”306 President Clinton’s executive order thus mandates
cost-benefit analysis, but only as a piece of important information,
not a decision rule. A 2000 rulemaking for establishing a new arsenic
standard for drinking water involved an extensive cost-benefit
analysis; in the end, the EPA chose a level at which the costs of
compliance slightly exceeded the benefits.307 EPA took the position
that because of the exclusion of some nonquantifiable benefits, and
given considerable uncertainties in the analysis, the benefits justified
the costs, even if they did not exceed them.308 Given the continued
uncertainties with respect to cost-benefit analysis—as the arsenic
rulemaking demonstrates—this approach of being a “tool, not a rule,”
seems appropriate.
There continues to be substantial concern, led by academics, over
the use of cost-benefit analysis in environmental law. Criticism takes
one of two forms: (i) pointing out methodological flaws that render
cost-benefit analysis unreliable,309 and (ii) categorical rejection, on
mostly deontological grounds, of cost-benefit analysis as a policymaking tool.310 The latter form of objection seems unhelpful,
book, wrote “Priceless takes apart the barren but intricate hokum of deregulatory
formulaics that have duped key members of the mass media and frozen your rights to a
cleaner, safer, and more efficient marketplace and environment.” Id. at back cover.
303. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
304. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 § 1(a)(3)(b)(1) (Feb. 17, 1981).
305. Id. § (a)(3)(e)(b) (emphasis added).
306. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 1(b)(6) (emphasis added).
307. Environmental Protection Agency, National Primary Drinking Water Regulations,
66 Fed. Reg. 6976-01, 7022 (Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 141 C.F.R. pt. 23).
308. Id.
309. See, e.g., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003); Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 GEO.
L.J. 2311 (2002) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic]; Lisa Heinzerling,
Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998) [hereinafter
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs]; Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189 (2000); Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L.
REV. 7 (1998); Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345 (2003).
310. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 302, at 35-40; MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY
OF THE EARTH 8-9 (1988).

2008]

THE IDENTIFIABILITY BIAS

493

especially when it involves one or two stories of cost-benefit analysis
gone bad, followed by an extrapolation to all that is wrong with
economics in environmental law.311 A more nuanced critique of costbenefit analysis takes a meta-view of cost-benefit analysis and
observes two things: (i) current U.S. environmental law, mostly
legislated in the 1970s, was not driven by cost-benefit analysis; and
(ii) in the current period of environmental inaction,312 cost-benefit
analysis currently seems to be doing more to hinder environmental
regulation than advance it.313 Hence, this critique goes, advocates of
cost-benefit analysis really haven’t made the case that cost-benefit
analysis can enhance environmental protection rather than, as critics
charge, hinder it.
This meta-view critique is true as far as it goes, but ignores all
else that could account for the current period of congressional and
executive inaction. The fundamental problem with environmental
law is that since the 1970s, public opinion on environmental law has
become more nuanced and complex over time. A much ballyhooed
2004 essay, The Death of Environmentalism, argued that the failure
of the environmental movement and of environmental organizations
has been that they have ignored the changing view of
environmentalism in an American household concerned with a
variety of issues, many of which are economic.314 This is bad news for
academic environmentalists, as it demeans the importance of their
profession, although the grand importance of global climate change
may pull environmentalism back onto the front burner. But even if
environmentalism gets a shot in the arm from the increasing
311. Ackerman and Heinzerling actually make great hay from the fact that Italian
economist Vilfredo Pareto was one of Benito Mussolini’s favorite teachers, and how
Mussolini Mussolini “looked forward to every one [of Pareto’s lectures].” ACKERMAN &
HEINZERLING, supra note 302, at 33 (quoting BENITO MUSSOLINI, MY AUTOBIOGRAPHY 14
(1928)). As the authors point out, “Pareto’s connection to Fascism is not usually mentioned
in economics textbooks.” Id. This suggestion that economists have fascist tendencies is
somewhat inconsistent with Ackerman and Heinzerling’s base claim that a group of
antiregulatory zealots have captured the regulatory process. Id. at 41-60. Ackerman and
Heinzerling also open their book with a particularly grievous example of an affluent driver
who killed two elderly pedestrians while driving and using her cell phone, and argued that
this kind of behavior is legitimized by the cost-benefit analyses that had been done on
regulating the use of cell phones while driving. Id. at 1-3.
312. No major federal environmental legislation has passed since the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments.
313. See, e.g., Robert R.M. Verchick, The Case Against Cost-Benefit Analysis, 32
ECOLOGY L.Q. 349, 372 (2005) (reviewing ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 302).
314. Michael Shellenberger & Ted Nordhaus, The Death of Environmentalism: Global
Warming
Politics
in
a
Post-Environmental
World
(2004),
available
at
http://www.thebreakthrough.org/images/Death_of_Environmentalism.pdf. The essay was
the subject of much discussion in the blogosphere, as well as print media. See, e.g., Felicity
Barrenger, Paper Sets Off a Debate on Environmentalism’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2005, § 1, at 18; Nicholas D. Kristof, I Have a Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2005, at
A15.
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awareness of global climate change, those arguing for greater
environmental protection will still have to answer the question of
how much, and how. That there is much low-hanging fruit to be
currently picked to arrest climate change dodges that question.315
No critic of cost-benefit analysis has truly grappled with the
relation of environmentalism to the overall ordering of society.
Virtually all environmental critics of cost-benefit analysis take as
their starting point the unquestioned need for more environmental
protection, without examining why. This Author agrees with that
assessment, but gaining more popular acceptance of why we protect
the environment is not a step that can be skipped over. This Article
argues that one way to remind ourselves of the importance of
protecting the environment is to remind ourselves of the
unidentifiable beneficiaries of environmental law. In moving forward
in a world that is concerned with the environment, but also economic
concerns, cost-benefit analysis is one of the few ways of accounting
for unidentifiable individuals.
The identifiability bias suggests that there must be some way of
placing the unidentifiable victims of environmental harm on an equal
footing with the identifiable economic victims of environmental
regulation. To do this, there must be a common metric. One possible
metric could be a measure of the total lives saved, but this has two
problems. First, a lives-saved metric would ignore the many illnesses
and non-fatal health problems caused by pollution. Failure to
account for them would raise a bias itself. Second, a lives-saved
metric would require an estimate of how many lives are saved by not
spending money on environmental protection and instead investing
money in economic growth. That economic growth produces more
health is, at least in commonly accepted measures, beyond dispute.
But exactly how much wealth produces an extra human life is a
thorny question, one that as yet lacks the empirical support of the
flipside question of how much a human life is “worth.”316 Another
possibility would be to include not just lives saved, but a whole menu
of health benefits of pollution prevention.317 However, this is just like
cost-benefit analysis, except without the final step—some way of

315. See, STERN REVIEW, supra note 72 (noting that actions amounting to about 1% of
world GDP may save 5% to 20% of world GDP, forever).
316. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAHN ET AL., AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR
REGULATORY STUDIES, DO FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE MORTALITY? (2000), available
at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=106; Randall Lutter et al.,
The Cost-per-Life-Saved Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 599
(1999).
317. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 302, at 212-16.
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grappling with the comparability of lives saved with other health
outcomes.318
When considered in this light, the idea of monetization becomes
more palatable, if only because it can be used to measure the effects
of so many kinds of environmental harm. Attempts to monetize some
environmental harms are controversially inaccurate, but stopping
there would beg the all-important question: how do we weigh the
importance of the environmental benefits against the economic costs
of regulation? The alternatives that have been suggested by
environmental advocates and legal scholars thus far have their own
problems, an extensive discussion of which is beyond the scope of this
Article. Suffice it to say, however, that these alternative paradigms
do not address the identifiability bias. Cost-benefit analysis
addresses the identifiability bias because the measure of human
sacrifice is not identifiability-dependent. The loss of human life and
the illness caused by pollution is accounted for and balanced against
the economic value of the pollution-producing activity. That we make
this balancing is indisputable, as we very consciously undertake risk,
as individuals and as a society. The goal of cost-benefit analysis
ought to be to emulate how we undertake risks and reproduce it in
environmental policy.
Since there is already a fair bit of current practice, and with a
great deal of emphasis being placed on cost-benefit analysis under
the Bush Administration,319 how might cost-benefit analysis be
changed to be more of an aide to environmental protection? First,
critics are correct in that a great deal of variation does exist in costbenefit practices,320 lending misplaced credence to the claim that it is
“hopelessly indeterminate.”321 A helpful way forward would be, as
Professor Daniel Cole has suggested, convening a National Academy
318. Ackerman and Heinzerling argue that in evaluating a variety of risks to human
health, “there is no formula.” Id. at 209. Given their vituperative prose, they even come
perilously close to endorsing cost-benefit analysis:
Much of the information used in an atomistic analysis would also be
relevant in what we call the holistic approach, where costs as a whole
(usually monetary) and benefits as a whole (often largely nonmonetary)
are considered together—but are not forced to be expressed in the same
units. Scientific information on risks to life, health, and the
environment, and economic data on the likely effects of regulation on
businesses and individuals, are of obvious importance to decisions about
public policy.
Id. at 212.
319. President Bush’s head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the
Office of Management and Budget was John D. Graham, a proponent of cost-benefit
analysis and a frequent target of Ackerman and Heinzerling. See, e.g., ACKERMAN &
HEINZERLING, supra note 302 at 41; Lisa Heinzerling, Risking it All, 57 ALA. L. REV. 103,
109 (2005); Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1097, 1100 (2006).
320. Cole, supra note 267, at 3.
321. Sinden, supra note 265, at 1454.
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of Sciences panel to develop a set of “best practices” of cost-benefit
analysis, against which agencies’ cost-benefit analyses might be
judged for their veracity and usefulness.322 All but the most vehement
critics of cost-benefit analysis concede that if done properly, it can
serve as an important piece of information. What has been sorely
lacking is some credible account of what it means to do a cost-benefit
analysis “properly.” The best chance at settling most of a bitter and
sometimes personal debate323 is to call on a body such as the National
Academy of Sciences, which still carries considerable weight and
good repute. A set of standards would also help avoid the timeconsuming turf wars between the Office of Management and Budget
and the separate regulatory agencies, most notably EPA,324 and
conduct a searching inquiry of a number of issues in need of
resolution, including the appropriate social discount rate, if any.325
Second, few mechanisms currently exist in which a cost-benefit
analysis is compelled in order to consider a regulation that was not
yet in the making; the executive orders merely call for cost-benefit
analysis when a regulation is proposed. The Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs at the Office of Management and Budget
322. Cole, supra note 267, at 3.
323. The following excerpts are illustrative of the sometimes personal nature of the
debate:
It is not hard to discover who started the myths of absurdly expensive
regulations. Follow the footnotes back to the original sources, and again
and again they lead to the same few, repeatedly cited studies, by John
Morrall, John Graham, Tammy Tengs, Ralph Keeney, W. Kip Viscusi, and
Randall Lutter. The tales of ‘killer regulations’ are based on just a handful
of authors, and on an even smaller handful of hard facts.
Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, Comment, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory
Movement, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 648, 649 (2002).
Richard Belzer, Robert Crandall, John Graham, Wendy Gramm, Robert
Hahn, Thomas Hopkins, Robert Litan, Randall Lutter, John Morrall, and
W. Kip Viscusi are not exactly household names. But they have had an
influence on attitudes towards protective regulation that is out of all
proportion to their name recognition and their size as a group. These
analysis and their institutional homes . . . are responsible for generating
the critical pieces of ‘antiregulatory’ data and analysis, upon which the
second Bush administration bases its ardently pro-industry stance.
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 302, at 41.
Any close observer of the regulatory process has learned by now that the
government often requires the expenditure of a huge sum of money—
sometimes billions of dollars—to save a single human life. She has also
learned that there are many regulatory options available that would
produce the same benefits at a far lower cost. She has learned these things
largely from a table prepared during the 1980s by an economist at the
Office of Management and Budget named John Morrall.
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs, supra note 309, at 1983.
324. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 267, at 8-20; Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies With
Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137
(2001).
325. See, e.g., Cole, supra, note 267, at 8-20; Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting, On Stilts,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (2007).
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(OMB) can send a “prompt letter” to federal agencies “to suggest an
issue that OMB believes is worthy of agency priority.”326 In other
words, this is a way that OMB can tell agencies about a problem
worthy of regulation. It would be unfair to say that OMB has idled
this mechanism, having issued thirteen prompt letters since 2001,
when the prompt letter was created. Prompt letters have called for
regulation requiring the labeling of foods containing transfatty
acids,327 the maintenance by certain employers of automatic external
defibrillators,328 greater disclosure for federal housing lenders Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac,329 better disclosure of data under the EPA’s
toxic release inventory,330 and, if one were generous, a prompt letter
was one of many forces pushing EPA to develop a rule regarding
particulate matter pollution.331 However, in the hands of an agency
that has as its primary mission the questioning of regulation,332 this
does not seem quite enough.
In addition to endorsing Professor Cole’s proposal, this Article
immodestly proposes a new mechanism: the citizen prompt letter.
Like citizen suits, the citizen prompt letter is intended to provide a
voice to otherwise under-represented interests. However, something
more must be required than the simple, three-page requests that the
326. Office
of
Management
and
Budget,
OIRA
Prompt
Letters,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_letter.html [hereinafter OMB Prompt
Letter Web Site] (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
327. Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, to Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services (Sept. 18, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/hhs_prompt_letter.html.
328. Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, to John Henshaw, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety
Administration (Sept. 18, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress
/osha_prompt_letter.html.
329. Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, to Armando Falcon, Jr., Director, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(May 29, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_ofheo
052902.html. The prompt letter was sent to the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO), the agency regulating housing lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
urging the agency to mandate greater disclosures from the federal lenders. OFHEO
responded that they were working “expeditiously to complete the review and develop
proposals for a rulemaking.” Letter from Armando Falcon, Jr., Director, Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight, to John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information
and
Regulatory
Affairs
(June
28,
2002),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_ofheo_response.pdf. In December, 2004,
scandal over unorthodox and misleading accounting practices forced out several Fannie
Mae officials, including, ironically, former OMB director Franklin Raines. David S.
Hilzenrath, Fannie Mae’s Top Executives Leaving Firm, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2004, at A01.
330. Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, to Kim T. Nelson, Assistant Administrator, Office of Environmental Information,
U.S.
Environmental
Protection
Agency
(Mar.
4,
2002),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/epa_tri3_prompt030402.html.
331. Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order For Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1523
(2002).
332. Id. at 1523-24.
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OIRA director can issue,333 otherwise it would be simple to flood an
agency with spurious requests. I thus propose that unlike the current
prompt letter process, a citizen prompt letter must be supported by a
cost-benefit analysis, demonstrating that the benefits of a proposed
regulation would exceed the costs. Agencies would be required within
some period of time to respond to requests by any person calling for
study of a regulation, if the request is supported by a credible costbenefit analysis that the costs of regulation would be outweighed by
the benefits. What would “credible” mean? That is something that
the future National Academy of Sciences panel would help
determine. For those that would worry that such a mechanism would
produce a flurry of frivolous requests, the mere trouble of compiling a
cost-benefit analysis would surely discourage the gadfly
environmentalist from flooding agencies with regulation requests.
Second, with a set of National Academy of Sciences best practices
standards in place, it would be an easier administrative matter to
summarily dismiss those requests and cost-benefit analyses that do
not pass muster.
As in the case of prompt letters, an agency response could be of
the nature of “you’re right, we’re working on it.”334 In the case of a
request not supported by a cost-benefit analysis or attached to a costbenefit analysis that does not meet standards set out by the National
Academy of Sciences panel, an agency response could simply be of
the nature “go away, your request does not meet the standards
required of [the code provisions governing submission of citizen
prompt letters].” While it is true that this process will certainly
generate disputes over what cost-benefit analyses pass muster and
which do not, and while it is true that some agencies will, out of
sheer laziness, issue some “go away” letters even where regulation is
warranted, our lessons from NEPA indicate that the mere existence
of this process is important. Agencies often respond perfunctorily to
comments about rulemaking, but that does not diminish the
importance of the process of notice and comment itself. The fact that
regulated industries spend millions of dollars in legal fees submitting
comments through their lawyers, or that environmental
organizations spend an enormous amount of energy submitting
comments, is evidence of the innate importance of the notice and
comment process. For cost-benefit critics who find fault with the
333. See generally OMB Prompt Letter Web Site, supra note 326.
334. See, e.g., Letter from Armando Falcon, Jr., Director, Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight, to John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (June 28, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
prompt_ofheo_response.pdf.; Letter from Christine Todd Whitman, Administrator, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, to John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of
Information
and
Regulatory
Affairs
(Mar.
12,
2002),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_pm.pdf.
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transparency of cost-benefit analysis,335 a citizen prompt letter
process could not make the situation worse, and could well make it
better. Any response from an agency other than “go away” would
reveal some information about the assumptions of the agency in
balancing costs and benefits.
This proposal must certainly bring more information into
administrative agencies. The question might then be, would this
process bring too much information into an agency? Would citizen
prompt letters provide information that would skew an agency’s view
of a problem? In particular, does a citizen prompt letter proposal
heighten the danger of rent-seeking through regulation?
George Stigler’s The Theory of Economic Regulation,336 the
inspiration for much public choice theory and the intellectual grist
for much of what became the deregulation movement, might suggest
that if citizen prompt letters lead to more regulation, overall
economic efficiency might be ill-served. Stigler’s focus was more on
economic regulation, where the state’s power to coerce may be used
to restrict entry into markets and protect incumbents.337 This danger
is not trivial with respect to environmental regulation. Most
environmental lawyers are familiar with Ackerman and Hassler’s
Clean Coal/Dirty Air, in which the authors explain the imposition of
scrubber technology on coal-fired power plants as a way of preserving
mining jobs, because mandating scrubber technology preserved the
usefulness of the dirty, high-sulfur coal mined in the Appalachians.338
The victims of such rent-seeking are those that may have benefited
from market entry or who may have prospered by an electricity
industry much less dependent upon coal—ironically, unidentifiable
victims. But Stigler’s concern with rent-seeking is considerably more
troubling in the area of economic regulation than in environmental
regulation.
For this reason, and because this Article only seeks to correct
biases in environmental law, I propose, as an experimental first step,
that only the EPA be made to respond to citizen prompt letters.
Doubtless, there are many other agencies that issue environmental
regulations from time to time, and virtually all federal agencies carry
out activities that have some environmental impacts. But as this
might be considered by some to be a fairly radical proposal, it seems
prudent to focus initial efforts on studying this process on only one
335. Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, supra note 309, at 2333.
336. George Stigler, Economic Regulation, supra note 111.
337. Id. at 5-6 (describing how the Civil Aeronautics Board artificially restricted entry
into aviation and how savings and loan regulation has limited competition in banks, and
hypothesizing that “the regulatory policy will often be so fashioned as to retard the rate of
growth of new firms”).
338. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 31 (1981).
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agency, and on the one that makes a controversial use of cost-benefit
analysis.
This Author has written elsewhere on the problems of commandand-control environmental regulation, on the preferability of a
taxation scheme or a tradeable permit scheme,339 but the rentseeking possibilities in environmental abatement, of the sort
chronicled by Ackerman and Hassler, seem less dangerous. For one
thing, a cost-benefit analysis would, in this author’s opinion, reveal
the economic and environmental superiority of a taxation scheme or
a tradeable permits scheme. Second, there may be environmental
engineering firms that wish to mandate installation of their
particular abatement technology, but there will also be firms that
would be required to pay for that technology, that would resist
regulation. The history of environmental law is not dotted with
instances of over-regulation.340
This proposal would supplant none of the existing executive
orders, rules, regulations, and administrative law that speak to
rulemaking, administrative procedure, or cost-benefit analysis.
Promulgating a new rule would still require a “reasoned
determination that the benefits justify its costs.”341 All of
administrative law, including notice and comment provisions,
remain. All that this proposal adds is the ability for citizens and
citizen groups to participate in the cost-benefit analysis and to use
cost-benefit analysis in a way that may advance regulation, not just
question it.
Would Congress go for such a proposal? It is certainly possible, of
course, and perhaps even probable, that such a program would
increase the strain on agency resources. But in a time in which
neither environmentalists nor regulated industry groups are happy
with the job that federal agencies are doing, does it not make sense
to open up agencies to more citizen input? Every administrative law
scholar has either argued or acknowledged that agencies have
trouble collecting pertinent information on regulation; this proposal
would simply force agencies to consider the cost-benefit information
that is thrust before them. Of course, filtering out the useless, noncredible information is time-consuming, but the value of incoming
339. Shi-Ling Hsu, What’s Old is New: The Real Problem with New Source Review, 36
ENVTL. L. REP. 10095 (2006); Shi-Ling Hsu, Some Quasi-behavioral Arguments for
Environmental Taxation, in 5 CRITICAL ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION (Nathalie
Chalifour et al. eds., forthcoming 2008).
340. But see Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 331, at 1490-93. One of the authors’ main
points, however, is that cost-benefit analysis would reduce the instances of over-regulation,
a proposition with which this Author has no quarrel. See id.
341. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 1(b)(6) (Sept. 30, 1993). President
Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866 was amended by President Bush’s Executive Order No.
13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007).
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information must surely outweigh the administrative hassle of
sifting. Throw in an apparent increase in congressional interest in
the concept of cost-benefit analysis,342 and this proposal may actually
be a political winner.
The political winds have changed, subtly enough that most
Washington, D.C. environmentalists and academic environmentalists
have failed to notice that while the median voter remains concerned
about the environment, she is also concerned with economic wellbeing, especially in a globalized world of brutal economic
competition. Despite this, most important new initiatives aimed at
strengthening environmental protection would probably justify
themselves quite easily, if only the effort were made to compare the
benefits with the costs. With some adjustments and some enhanced
credibility lent by National Academy of Sciences intervention, costbenefit analysis may serve an important role in garnering some
representation of the interests of unidentifiable individuals.
4. Claim Aggregation
The nature of environmental and ecological harms is, at least for
most ex ante wrongs, probabilistic. For example, the environmental
wrong that is perpetrated by a polluter upon some downwind
population is an increase in risk of some disease caused by the
pollution. From an individual perspective, such inchoate harm is
generally not actionable under traditional tort principles.343 In MetroNorth Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley,344 the Supreme Court
rejected a claim for risk damages by a pipefitter that had been
negligently and repeatedly exposed to asbestos dust by his employer.
Writing for a seven-member majority, Justice Breyer ruled that
absent any physical symptoms of asbestos-related illness, the
exposure did not amount to an actionable “physical impact” that
would support a claim for negligently inflicted emotional distress.345
Importantly, Justice Breyer seemed particularly concerned with the
potential that an award of damages in a case like this would open the
floodgates to more claims, many of which would be fraudulent.346 In
342. Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 331, at 1508.
343. Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 964 n.4 (2003) (citing
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984));
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 163637 (2002).
344. 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
345. Id. at 430-33. The claim was founded on the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45
U.S.C. § 51 et seq., which codified many common law rules, including plaintiff’s negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim.
346. Id. at 433-34 (“Those reasons [of public policy for limiting negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims] include (a) special ‘difficult[y] for judges and juries’ in
separating valid, important claims from those that are invalid or ‘trivial,’ . . . (b) a threat of
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other words, Justice Breyer feared, as does traditional tort law, that
harmed plaintiffs may simply be too hard to identify in order to
justify recovery.
Given the difficulty facing individual plaintiffs exposed to
potential harm, or an increased risk of harm347 (which describes many
environmental
wrongs),
persons
exposed
to
large-scale
environmental risks would be well-advised to aggregate large-scale
risk-based claims,348 through, among other mechanisms, class action
lawsuits. The lack of individualized adjudication that has civil
proceduralists wringing their hands349 is a small price to pay if the
alternative is no legal recognition at all of any claim.350 Individuals
have had difficulty establishing a harm from risk on an individual
level, but risks imposed upon a population actually result in harm to
a statistically identifiable number of individuals within the
population, translating a mere risk of harm into an actual harm,
albeit not suffered by every individual within that population.
Whereas individual plaintiffs such as Buckley, having only a risk to
show as harm and having a hard time meeting the threshold of proof,
a group of individuals may be able to meet the burden as a group,
because they can show with statistical certainty that some of which
will suffer harm. Moreover, a collectivized claim for the imposition of
a risk, if successful, serves deterrence and compensation policies of
tort law.351
An aggregation of claims for environmental wrongs in the form of
heightened risk exposure helps solve the identifiability problem not
only because the evidentiary task is less onerous than it would be for
individualized claims, but also because it creates a reference group
that is smaller and thus more identifiable than that of simply society
at large. An aggregation of plaintiffs creates a reference group that
can be thought of as having suffered a group wrong—a downwind
community that now faces higher rates of lung cancer, or a
community with a toxic waste problem and a higher incidence of
childhood leukemia. This is heuristically much easier to envision and
identify, and therefore stands a better chance of overcoming the kind
of legislative and judicial resistance that has plagued environmental
advocacy in the past. While not every environmental wrong will take
on the status of a Love Canal or a Woburn or a Bhopal, the creation
‘unlimited and unpredictable liability,’ . . . and (c) the ‘potential for a flood’ of
comparatively unimportant, or ‘trivial,’ claims.” Id. at 433).
347. Andrew R. Klein, A Model for Enhanced Risk Recovery in Tort, 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1173, 1179-82 (1999).
348. David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in
Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996).
349. Id. at 212-14 (Professor Rosenberg’s lament).
350. Id. at 241-48.
351. Id. at 236-48.
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of a discrete reference group will at least counterbalance the
identifiability bias, while the aggregation of wrongs serves to create a
legally cognizable harm.
Environmental advocates can learn from lawyers representing
mass claimants in other substantive areas. Securities fraud and
antitrust violations share much in common with environmental
wrongs. All three types of wrongs involve harms that might be small
when viewed from an individual perspective, but since they may
involve many individuals, can be quite large in the aggregate. All
three typically involve many unidentifiable victims. All three involve
collective action problems in terms of the low incentives of
individuals to bring claims,352 and all three have made use of class
action lawsuits.353 However, only securities cases and antitrust cases
have a solid body of case and statutory law on measuring damages.
For securities law, the “fraud on the market” theory354 has become
well-settled law, as have other price-based theories,355 and consumer
welfare damage theories have become a part of antitrust law,356 along
with the statutory treble damages.357 However, no theory of
environmental or natural resource damages has taken root in such a
way as to provide a default method of ascertaining environmental or
natural resource damages. As noted in the discussion above on costbenefit analysis, environmentalists have generally resisted
monetizations of environmental and natural resource goods and
outcomes.358 This is not helpful from the standpoint of recovery for
environmental wrongs. As many detractors of environmental
regulation have learned, invoking cost figures does not necessarily
cheapen the human hardships (real or not) of environmental
regulation and does not necessarily reduce their identifiability.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Because humans have natural propensities to identify with other
humans and to sympathize with other humans that are known to
them, overcoming an identifiability bias in lawmaking is a difficult
task. Lawmaking should obviously reflect human values and, to some
extent, human propensities. Sympathy is not something that should
352. Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and
Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71 (2007).
353. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 295 (2d Cir. 1968).
354. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988).
355. See, e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc., v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-45 (2005); Green v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976).
356. David C. Hjelmfelt & Channing D. Strother, Jr., Antitrust Damages for Consumer
Welfare Loss, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 505, 520 (1991).
357. See, e.g., Am. Soc. of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. 456 U.S. 556, 572-76
(1982).
358. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
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be expunged from lawmaking processes. But sympathy is also not a
human propensity that should be driving policy, least of all
environmental policy. Our sympathy for identifiable individuals
must be bounded by a realization that others, not necessarily known
to us, die and suffer. Just recognizing that we will naturally harbor
an identifiability bias would be progress in itself. Structural reforms
might be considered that would build in considerations other than
the immediate and visceral effects on identifiable individuals,
communities, and groups. In addition, maintaining the existing
safeguards, such as the Endangered Species Act and the National
Environmental Policy Act, will be vital.
Substantively debiasing environmental policy to compensate for
identifiability bias is a taller order. This would require that we
grapple with the question of how we compare the harm done to
identifiable victims with unidentifiable ones. In the regulatory arena,
this is the business of cost-benefit analysis, which is clearly
unfinished. In other arenas, it requires the evaluation of delicate
ethical tradeoffs, the making of which is clearly a large job before us.
In some ways, the identifiability bias should be obvious to those
involved in making environmental law and policy. The very reason
that we need environmental law is to protect those things that we
might not otherwise think to protect or take insufficient care to
protect in a competitive market economy. Identifiability is thus just
one aspect of the overall goal of environmental law. But whereas we
remain cognizant of the market failures that give rise to the general
need for environmental law, our hubris has caused us to sometimes
forget that we do not always have all of the stakeholders in front of
us. We thus do not have sufficient safeguards built in to protect those
that most need protecting, those that we cannot identify.

